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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The nature and importance of the right to vote  
 
The right to vote is a pillar of a representative democracy. Section 19 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―the Constitution‖) translates the constitutional 
commitment to democracy into an individual right to participate in representative politics.
1
 
Section 1(d) of the Constitution states that South Africa is a sovereign democratic state 
founded on certain values, one of which is ―[u]niversal adult suffrage, a national common 
voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.‖2 According to Theunis Roux, section 1(d) 
contains and supports a ―deep principle of democracy‖ that attributes a duty to the 
government to ―ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.‖3 Although democracy 
means different things for different people, democratic governance entails that the views of 
those affected by government decisions be valued when such decisions are made.
4
  
 
The Constitutional Court has on various occasions expressed the importance attached to the 
right to vote. Sachs J expressed the importance of the right in our constitutional democracy: 
 
―Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the foundational values of our 
entire constitutional order.  The achievement of the franchise has historically been important 
both for the acquisition of the rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans 
regardless of race, and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood.  The 
universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and democracy.  The vote of 
each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood.  Quite literally, it says that 
everybody counts.  In a country of great disparities of wealth and power it declares that 
whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same 
                                                          
1
 De Waal J ‗Political Rights‘ in Klaaren J, Marcus G, Spitz D & Woolman S (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (1999) 24-1&2; Section 19 of the Constitution reads as follow: ―(1) Every citizen is free to make political 
choices, which includes the right- (a) to form a political party; (b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit 
members for, a political party; and (e) to campaign for a political party or cause. (2) Every citizen has the right 
to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution. (3) Every 
adult citizen has the right- (a) to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the 
Constitution, and to do so in secret; and (b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.‖ 
2
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3
 Roux T ‗The Principle of Democracy in South African Constitutional Law‘ in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Conversations (2008) 78-79. 
4
 De Waal J ‗Political Rights‘ in Klaaren J, Marcus G, Spitz D & Woolman S (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (1999) 24-1. 
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democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a single interactive 
polity.‖5 
 
O‘Regan J held, in the New National Party case, that the obligation to afford citizens the right 
to vote is important, not only because of the youth of our constitutional democracy but also 
because of the ‗emphatic‘ denial of democracy in the past.6 Because of the past and voter 
exclusions based on race, South Africans should treasure the power of the franchise, and the 
importance of its universality.
7
 O‘Regan J also made the following statement regarding the 
link between the right to vote and our constitutional democracy: 
 
―In exercising the right to vote, each citizen affirms and invigorates our constitutional 
democracy. To build the resilient democracy envisaged by the Constitution, we need to 
establish a culture of participation in the political process, as well as tolerance of different 
political views and a recognition that democracy can be a unifying force even where political 
goals may be diverse.‖8 
 
More importantly O‘Regan J expressed the importance of the right to vote by stating the 
following: 
 
―The right to vote is more than a symbol of our common citizenship; it is also an instrument for 
determining who should exercise political power in our society.‖9  
 
In the Richter case, O‘Regan J again made the link between the right to vote and our 
constitutional democracy by expressing the constitutional importance of the right and its 
exercise: 
 
―The right to vote, and the exercise of it, is a crucial working part of our democracy. […] The 
moment of voting reminds us that both electors and the elected bear civic responsibilities 
arising out of our democratic Constitution and its values.  We should accordingly approach any 
case concerning the right to vote mindful of the bright, symbolic value of the right to vote as 
                                                          
5
 August v Electoral Commission (CCT8/99) [1999] ZACC 3; 1999 (3) SA 1; 1999 (4) BCLR 363 at [17]. 
6
 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT9/99) [1999] ZACC 5; 
1999 (3) SA 191; 1999 (5) BCLR 489 at [120] (hereafter New National Party v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa (1999)). 
7
 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa (1999) at [120]; according to Cliffs Notes 
‗Race and Ethnicity Defined‘ available at http://www.cliffsnotes.com/sciences/sociology/race-and-
ethnicity/race-and-ethnicity-defined (accessed 14 February 2015) the word ―race‖ refers to ―groups of people 
who have differences and similarities in biological traits deemed by society to be socially significant, meaning 
that people treat other people differently because of them. For instance, while differences and similarities in eye 
colour have not been treated as socially significant, differences and similarities in skin colour have.‖ 
8
 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa (1999) at [120]. 
9
 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa (1999) at [120]. 
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well as the deep, democratic value that lies in a citizenry conscious of its civic responsibilities 
and willing to take the trouble that exercising the right to vote entails.‖10 
 
The right to vote (as the essence of representative democracy) is often contrasted with the 
participatory dimension of democracy.
11
 In the Doctors for life case, Yacoob J underscored 
the centrality of the right to vote even in a participatory democracy: 
  
―Oppression and exploitation during apartheid was the result of the painful fact that the 
majority of people had no vote and were not represented in Parliament.  Millions of people 
suffered, tens of thousands of people were tortured and even died and millions of people 
struggled against the apartheid regime.  Any suggestion that the struggle and sacrifice of the 
past was predominantly aimed at securing public participation in the making of laws represents, 
in my view, a cynical denial of the phenomenal extent of apartheid devastation and pain.  The 
failure to accord due weight to the actions and decisions of the representatives of the people of 
South Africa would demean the very struggle for democracy.‖12 
 
The right to vote is a symbol of our citizenship. Section 19 of our Constitution affirms this 
symbolic value of the right by awarding the right to ―every citizen‖. Precisely because the 
right to vote has both symbolic and operative value, the participation of citizens should be 
broadened, and all electoral legislation should be interpreted teleologically to encourage 
enfranchisement over disenfranchisement.
13
 
 
                                                          
10
 Richter v The Minister for Home Affairs and Others (with the Democratic Alliance and Others Intervening, 
and with Afriforum and Another as Amici Curiae) (CCT03/09, CCT 09/09) [2009] ZACC 3; 2009 (3) SA 615 
(CC); 2009 (5) BCLR 448 (CC) at [53]. 
11
 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School and Another; 
Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School and Another 
[2013] ZACC 25; 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC); 2014 (2) SA 228 (CC) at [137]–[139]; Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa ‗A People‘s Government, the People‘s Voice‘ available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=296 (accessed 14 February 2015) describes both 
―representative democracy‖ and ―participatory democracy‖. ―Representative democracy, that is government by 
men and women elected in free and fair elections in which each adult citizen's vote is equally weighted 
(universal suffrage), [refers to when] [r]epresentatives are elected to office and are charged with the 
responsibility of making decisions on behalf of the electorate […] In its narrowest interpretation, representative 
democracy means that elected representatives must directly represent the views of those who voted them into 
power.‖ In as far as participatory democracy is concerned; Parliament refers to it in the following way: 
―[p]articipatory democracy, it is suggested, is a form of representative democracy in which citizens are actively 
involved in the decision-making processes of government[…] Participatory democracy is not necessarily a new 
or different form of democracy, but a strengthening or expansion of formal representative democracy to include 
greater levels of participation by civil society [and it] aims to empower civil society to drive legislative and 
policy agendas from the grassroots.‖ 
12
 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT12/05) [2006] ZACC 11; 
2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at [294] (hereafter Doctors for Life International v Speaker 
of the National Assembly (2006)). 
13
 African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission (003/11 IEC) [2011] ZAEC 2 at [23]: ―These 
foundational values require a court of law, and the Electoral Commission, when interpreting provisions in 
electoral statutes to seek to promote enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement and participation rather 
than exclusion.‖ 
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1.2 Limitations on the right to vote  
 
Despite the importance attached to the right to vote and the constitutional value of ―universal 
adult suffrage‖, the right is (and has always been) subject to limitations. One of the express 
limitations on the right, as found in the wording of section 19(2)(a) of the Constitution, is that 
it is a right which is only available to ―adult citizens‖, meaning from the start that children 
and foreigners do not have enjoyment of this right in our country. Other possible limitations 
include, but are not limited to, residence, mental capacity, and imprisonment.
14
 In the past the 
most common limitation was based on race, when black South Africans were deprived of the 
right to vote.  
The focus of this mini-thesis falls on imprisonment as voter exclusion and as a possible 
justifiable limitation on the right to vote. Imprisonment was one of the common voter 
exclusions during the Apartheid era; however, the exclusion of prisoners was not limited to 
Apartheid South Africa. Many open and democratic societies continue to impose voting 
disabilities on some categories of prisoners.
15
 For some time, the same was the case in Post-
Apartheid South Africa as well.  
 
In terms of section 36 of the Constitution, any limitation of any right in the Bill of Rights can 
only take place if such limitation can be reasonably justified. In order for a limitation of 
section 19 to be justifiable, the law imposing a limitation on the right must (i) have a 
legitimate aim, (ii) there must be a rational connection between the limitation and the aim, 
and (iii) the limitation must be reasonable or proportional.
16
 The same applies to voting 
rights: ―[r]ights may not be limited without justification and legislation dealing with the 
franchise must be interpreted in favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement‖.17 
 
1.3 Imprisonment as voter exclusion 
 
As mentioned, in this mini-thesis the focus falls on imprisonment as voter exclusion. With 
regards to active voting rights, prisoner exclusions have always been provided for in 
legislation, whereas passive voting rights exclusions have always been provided for in the 
                                                          
14
 For a fuller discussion of these voter exclusions see López-Guerra C Democracy and Disenfranchisement: 
The Morality of Electoral Exclusions (2014).    
15
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [31]. 
16
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 36. 
17
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [17]. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Constitution. As far as passive voting rights are concerned, the Apartheid and Post-Apartheid 
Constitutions have consistently excluded certain convicted prisoners from membership in the 
legislature.
18
 As far as active voting rights are concerned, the position is less uniform. It is 
useful to trace the exclusion of prisoners back to Apartheid when all convicted prisoners were 
disenfranchised. The Electoral Act 45 of 1979 excluded all convicted and sentenced prisoners 
from voting and distinguished between permanent and temporary disenfranchisement.
19
 
There was thus a blanket ban on prisoner‘s voting rights during Apartheid. Initially, Post-
Apartheid legislation, as it was amended on three occasions, either excluded certain convicted 
prisoners,
20
 or all of them (by implication).
21
 Under the 1993 Electoral Act, certain categories 
of prisoners were disqualified. Like the 1979 Act, these disqualifications were linked to the 
type of offence committed and whether or not a particular person was sentenced to 
imprisonment as a result of having committed such offence and did not get the option of a 
fine. In the 1998 Electoral Act this prisoner disqualification was removed. This amendment 
resulted in uncertainty whether prisoners could vote or were still excluded by necessary 
implication. This uncertainty gave rise to the August case, in which the Court held that 
prisoners could vote and that it was the duty of the Electoral Commission to make sure that 
all prisoners are enabled to vote.
22
 Parliament responded to this judgment with the 2003 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act, which reinserted an explicit exclusion of certain categories 
of prisoners, no longer based on the type of offence committed, but the type of sentenced 
imposed (imprisonment without an option of a fine). This amendment gave rise to the NICRO 
case in which the Court found this explicit voter exclusion unconstitutional. Parliament 
officially aligned the Electoral Act with the NICRO judgment by explicitly enfranchising all 
prisoners by amending the Act in 2013.
23
 As the law stands, all prisoners are permitted to 
vote in South Africa; no voter exclusion applies at present to prisoners under Post-Apartheid 
law.  
 
The purpose of this mini-thesis is to assess the present position regarding prisoner 
disenfranchisement in South Africa from a human rights perspective, and to recommend 
reforms of South African electoral legislation as far as prisoners‘ voting rights are concerned.  
                                                          
18
 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993 and Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 respectively. 
19
 Electoral Act 45 of 1979, sections 4(1) (a), 4(1)(b), 4(2) (a), 134(3)(a), and 144(1). 
20
 Electoral Act 87 of 1993, section 16(d) and Electoral Laws Amendment Act 34 of 2003, section 24B(2). 
21
 Electoral Act 73 of 1998, section 8(2). 
22
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [36] 
23
 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) at [65]. 
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1.4 The structure of the argument 
 
In the first chapter, prisoners‘ voting rights in South Africa and under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights (―African Charter‖)24 is assessed and discussed in relation to 
legislation and case law. An assessment of prisoners‘ active voting rights, as traced from the 
Electoral Act of 1979 (last Apartheid era Electoral Act) via the August and NICRO cases till 
the 2013 Electoral Act, reveals that prisoner disenfranchisement is not as such incompatible 
with the right to vote under the Bill of Rights or the African Charter, as long as the 
disenfranchisement does not include all prisoners. The Constitutional Court confirmed that 
prisoners may in principle be disenfranchised, as long as it is not a blanket 
disenfranchisement, and as long as it is not the exclusion as found in the 2003 Electoral Act. 
What the Court did not do, however, was to clarify to the legislature which type of prisoner 
exclusions would be constitutionally justifiable. It remains an open constitutional question 
which kind of prisoner exclusion would be justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution. 
This unresolved question is problematic, because even though Parliament extended the 
franchise to all prisoners in the 2013 Act, future legislatures might decide to reintroduce the 
exclusion of some prisoners. Nevertheless, in the NICRO case, Chaskalson CJ and Ngcobo J 
both suggested that an active voting rights exclusion might pass constitutional muster if it 
mirrored the passive voting rights exclusion contained in the Constitution. The Constitution 
provides for the exclusion of prisoners from standing for public office; it does so in terms of 
section 47(1)(e). The section excludes those serving a sentence of imprisonment of more than 
12 months and extends this disqualification to five years after the expiration of the prison 
sentence.  
 
The compatibility between the human right to vote and this constitutionally mandated 
exclusion (as a model of voter exclusions generally) cannot be tested under South African 
law. The question remains whether the constitutional position with regards to passive voting 
rights (and on the suggestions by Chaskalson CJ and Ngcobo J also active voting rights) is 
compatible with international and regional human rights law (in this case African Human 
Rights Law). This issue is addressed in the second part of chapter two. The initial conclusion 
reached here is that the African Charter and the African case law, as heard by the African 
Court of Human Rights, is unclear. Neither the African Court nor the African Commission 
                                                          
24
 (Also referred to as the “Banjul Charter”) adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 27 June 1981 and entered into force 
on 21 October 1986. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev 5 
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has dealt with cases relating to prisoners‘ voting rights (both active and passive). Because of 
this lack of African jurisprudence, a comparative look beyond the African system is required. 
 
The third chapter investigates the status of prisoner disenfranchisement under the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with particular 
reference to the right of prisoners to vote in the United Kingdom (the ―UK‖). The purpose of 
this chapter is to determine which prisoner exclusion the European Court of Human Rights 
(―European Court‖) accepts as being compatible with the European Convention.  This is done 
in an attempt to establish whether the South African constitutional provision which deals with 
the passive voting rights exclusions (also active voting rights exclusions) is compatible with 
comparative regional international human rights. The conclusion is that the exclusion 
contained in section 47(1)(e) of the South African Constitution is the type of exclusion which 
the European Court would accept as being compatible with the Convention.  
 
The mini-thesis concludes, in Chapter four, by arguing that a legislative voter exclusion, 
modelled on the existing constitutional limitation on the passive voting rights of citizens, 
would be compatible with section 19(3) of the Bill of Rights, the African Charter, and 
international human rights law generally. Whether such a voter exclusion should be 
reintroduced into Post-Apartheid law is thus purely a matter of policy. Given the threat which 
serious crime poses to the culture of human rights and democracy,
25
 there are no sound policy 
reasons why such a voter exclusion should not be reintroduced. To this end, the mini-thesis 
concludes with a proposal that the Electoral Act be amended as soon as possible to 
disenfranchise all prisoners serving a sentence of imprisonment of more than 12 months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 In Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa (CCT 48/10) [2011] ZACC 6; 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC); 
2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC) at [57] the Constitutional Court warned that serious crime threatens our young 
democracy: ―Corruption has become a scourge in our country and it poses a real danger to our developing 
democracy. It undermines the ability of the government to meet its commitment to fight poverty and to deliver 
on other social and economic rights guaranteed in our Bill of Rights. Organised crime and drug syndicates also 
pose a real threat to our democracy.‖ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
PRISONERS’ VOTING RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN UNION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter prisoners‘ voting rights will be discussed in light of section 19(3) of the 
Constitution and in light of electoral legislation. This discussion will be limited to post-
Apartheid developments from the 1994 election onwards, and will include national, 
provincial and local government elections. The development of prisoners‘ voting rights will 
be traced from the 1994 election via August
26
 and NICRO
27
 to the 2013 amendment of the 
Electoral Act. This discussion and assessment of the development will include both active 
and passive voting rights. The history of prisoner‘s voting rights in post-Apartheid South 
African will be evaluated against the law and jurisprudence of the African Union.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the South African Constitutional Court failed 
to finalise the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement, because it acknowledges that certain 
prisoners may reasonably be disqualified from voting, without prescribing to the legislature 
which prisoners may be so excluded. The Court has thus left this open by omitting to guide 
and give Parliament an indication as to which classes of prisoners could be reasonably 
excluded.
28
 The other purpose of this chapter is to determine which classes of prisoners can 
reasonably be excluded, meaning which exclusion will pass constitutional muster. 
 
2.2 The active voting rights of prisoners in South Africa (1994-2014) 
 
Provision is made for active voting rights in section 19(3)(a) of the Constitution. This section 
states the following: 
 
―Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any legislative body established in 
terms of the Constitution, and to do so in secret.‖  
                                                          
26
 August v Electoral Commission (CCT8/99) [1999] ZACC 3; 1999 (3) SA 1; 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (hereafter 
August v Electoral Commission (1999)). 
27
 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders 
(NICRO) [2004] ZACC; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) (hereafter Minister of Home Affairs v 
NICRO (2004)) . 
28
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [31]. 
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This section should be read with section 19(2) which provides for the right to free, fair and 
regular elections.
29
 Section 19(2) gives content to the right to vote and it obliges the 
government to make proper arrangements for the effective exercise of the right to vote, as 
contained in section 19(3)(a).
30
 This right, like all other rights in the Bill of Rights, can be 
limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. The next part of this chapter contains a 
chronological description of the law of prisoner disenfranchisement during the 20 years 
between 1994 and 2014. However, the history begins with the Apartheid legislation of 1979. 
 
2.2.1 Electoral Act 45 of 1979 
 
The Electoral Act 45 of 1979 contained a blanket exclusion of all convicted and sentenced 
prisoners. In addition, the Act distinguished between citizens who were permanently 
disenfranchised as a result of their prior imprisonment, and citizens who were only 
temporarily disenfranchised for the duration of their incarceration.  
 
In terms of section 4(1)(a) permanent disenfranchisement was activated if a person had been 
convicted of treason, or of murder; or of an offence under the Internal Security Act 44 of 
1950, or the Terrorism Act 83 of 1967, in respect of which he or she had been sentenced to a 
period of imprisonment without the option of a fine. These individuals were not allowed to be 
registered or to remain registered as a voter.  
 
Sections 134(3)(a), 144(1) and section 4(1)(b) of the Act made provision for temporary 
disenfranchisement. Under the first two of these sections citizens could be declared 
temporarily incapable of being registered or of voting for up to five years (for corrupt, i.e. 
bribery) and two years (for illegal, i.e. conducting an opinion poll among voters) election 
practices, regardless of, and in addition to, any other criminal sentence. Here the court had 
discretion to suspend the voting rights of convicted criminals for up to five years in addition 
to their criminal sentence. Section 4(1)(b) of the Act confirmed that no person was allowed to 
                                                          
29
 In terms of this provision ―[e]very citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative 
body established in terms of the Constitution.‖ 
30
 De Waal J ‗Political Rights‘ in Klaaren J, Marcus G, Spitz D & Woolman S (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (1999) 24-8, in New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT9/99) 
[1999] ZACC 5; 1999 (3) SA 191; 1999 (5) BCLR 489 Yacoob J held in para [11] that the right to vote is 
fundamental to our democracy and without it there can be no democracy. He emphasised the importance of 
making arrangements for the effective exercise of the right by stating that ―[…] the mere existence of the right 
to vote without proper arrangements for its effective exercise does nothing for a democracy; it is both empty and 
useless.‖ 
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register or remain registered as a voter, if he or she had been convicted of any corrupt or 
illegal practice under the Act, and had been declared incapable of being registered or of 
voting at any election during any period, and the period had not expired. 
 
 Section 4(2)(a) of the Act contained a more general exclusion clause. It provided that a 
citizen who had been convicted of an offence, in respect of which he or she had been 
sentenced to a period of imprisonment without the option of a fine, was not entitled to be 
registered as a voter or to vote in any election during the period of his or her detention.  
 
This summation ought to give one an idea as to the Apartheid position regarding prisoner 
disenfranchisement and will assist in understanding the post-Apartheid Electoral Acts, as will 
follow. 
 
2.2.2 Electoral Act 202 of 1993  
 
South Africa‘s transitional process from Apartheid to a democracy commenced on 2 February 
1990. Negotiations commenced between the Apartheid government (National Party) and the 
main opponent (African National Congress) in which other political parties joined at a later 
stage.
31
 By December 1993 a consensus had been reached with regards to a political 
transition to majority rule.
32
 After this agreement was reached South Africa adopted ‗a 
package of interrelated statutes‘: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993 (‗Interim Constitution‘), Electoral Act 202 of 1993, and Independent Electoral 
Commission Act 150 of 1993.
33
 
 
The Electoral Act 202 of 1993 was passed to regulate the first, non-racial, National and 
Provincial democratic elections which were held on 27 April 1994. This Act disqualified 
certain classes of people from voting. The original version of the Electoral Act 202 of 1993 
was adopted in December 1993 and assented to in January 1994. Section 16(d) of the Act, the 
provision which disenfranchised prisoners, stated the following: 
 
                                                          
31
 Independent Electoral Commission ‗Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: the South African 
Elections of April 1994‘ (1994) Johannesburg: Independent Electoral Commission 7. 
32
 Independent Electoral Commission ‗Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: the South African 
Elections of April 1994‘ (1994) 7. 
33
 Independent Electoral Commission ‗Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: the South African 
Elections of April 1994‘ (1994) 8. 
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―Notwithstanding the provisions of section 15, no person shall be entitled to vote in the election 
if that person is serving a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine in respect of 
any of the following specified offences involving violence or dishonesty: (i) Murder, culpable 
homicide, rape, indecent assault, child stealing, kidnapping, assault with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm, robbery, malicious injury to property and breaking or entering any premises with 
intent to commit an offence; (ii) fraud, corruption and bribery; or (iii) any attempt to commit 
any offence referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii)‖ 
 
This section was amended immediately before election on 25 April 1994 to extend the 
number of prisoners who could vote. In order to enfranchise more prisoners the list of 
offences were reduced from 13 offences to 3. On election day the amended section 16(d) 
provided as follows: 
 
―Notwithstanding the provisions of section 15, no person shall be entitled to vote in the election 
if that person is […] detained in a prison after being convicted and sentenced without the 
option of a fine in respect of any of the following offences irrespective of any other sentence in 
respect of any offence not mentioned hereunder which is served concurrently with the first 
mentioned sentence: (i) Murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances and rape; or (ii) any 
attempt to commit any offence referred to in subparagraph (i).‖ 
 
There are two similarities between this provision and section 4(1)(a) of the 1979 Electoral 
Act. Both provisions excluded convicted prisoners who were in prison after being convicted 
of an offence without the option of a fine from voting. The other similarity is that both 
sections list murder as an offence which would warrant disenfranchisement.  
 
With regards to allowing prisoners to cast special votes section 39 of Act 202 of 1993 made 
such provision for certain prisoners. Section 39 (7)(a) provided the following: 
 
―Any convicted prisoner or person awaiting trial being detained who is not excluded from 
voting in terms of section 16(d) may only vote by special vote under this section: Provided that 
such a vote shall be taken--(i) at the prison or place where he or she is detained; and (ii) on the 
date determined for the casting of special votes.‖ 
 
During negotiations and the drafting of the Electoral Act 1993, one of the main issues was 
deciding whether or not prisoners should be permitted to vote. Some wished to extend the 
franchise to all prisoners and others were more conservative, because they did not want to 
extend the franchise to prisoners, thus the negotiation sought to strike a balance between 
these two competing interests.
34
 ―Such representations culminated in several reformulations, 
                                                          
34
 Independent Electoral Commission ‗Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: the South African 
Elections of April 1994‘ (1994) 10. 
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the last being promulgated the day before the elections.‖35 From this quote it is apparent that 
section 16(d) was promulgated at the last-minute. The reason for the last-minute 
promulgation was, because of the controversial nature of prisoner voting the negotiating 
parties could not reach consensus on the issue earlier. 
 
After the 1994 National and Provincial election the Independent Electoral Commission 
(‗IEC‘) recommended that the issue regarding the right of prisoners to participate in elections 
should be resolved before the 1999 election.
36
 Parliament responded to this recommendation 
by enacting the 1998 Electoral Act. 
  
2.2.3 Electoral Act 73 of 1998 
 
The initial disqualification of certain convicted prisoners was removed when the Electoral 
Act 73 of 1998 was adopted to regulate the second post-apartheid National and Provincial 
elections of 1999. It is apparent from the provisions below that prisoners were not mentioned 
in the Act at all. The Electoral Act 73 of 1998 made provision for the registration of all 
eligible voters in sections 6(1), 7(1), 8(1) and 8(2). Section 6(1) stated the following: 
 
 ―Any South African citizen in possession of an identity document may apply for registration as 
a voter.‖ 
 
In terms of section 7(1)(b): 
 
―A person applying for registration as a voter must do so only for the voting district in which 
that person is ordinarily resident.‖ 
 
Section 8(1) and (2) stated the following: 
 
―(1) If satisfied that a person‘s application for registration complies with this Act, the chief 
electoral officer must register that person as a voter by making the requisite entries in the 
voters‘ roll. (2) The chief electoral officer may not register a person as a voter if that person— 
(a) has applied for registration fraudulently or otherwise than in the prescribed manner; (b) is 
not a South African citizen; (c) has been declared by the High Court to be of unsound mind or 
mentally disordered; (d) is detained under the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act No. 18 of 1973); or 
                                                          
35
 Independent Electoral Commission ‗Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: the South African 
Elections of April 1994‘ (1994) 10. 
36
 Independent Electoral Commission ‗Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: the South African 
Elections of April 1994‘ (1994) 85. 
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(e) is not ordinarily resident in the voting district for which that person has applied for 
registration.‖ 
 
Prisoners were neither permitted nor disqualified from registering and voting as can be seen 
from these two provisions. Parliament was thus silent on whether the chief electoral officer 
may or may not register convicted prisoners to enable them to vote. Prisoners were also not 
regarded as a class for whom the Electoral Commission should make special arrangements to 
allow them to vote. This was apparent from section 33(1)(a) and (b) which contained the 
following provision:  
 
―(1) The Commission—(a) must allow a person to apply for a special vote if that person cannot 
vote at a voting station in the voting district in which the person is registered as a voter, due to 
that person‘s—(i) physical infirmity or disability, or pregnancy; (ii) absence from the Republic 
on Government service or membership of the household of the person so being absent; or (iii) 
absence from that voting district while serving as an officer in the election concerned, or while 
on duty as a member of the security services in connection with the election; (b) may prescribe 
other categories of persons who may apply for special votes.‖ 
 
The Electoral Commission thus implicitly excluded prisoners from voting, because it did not 
prescribe prisoners as ―other [category] of persons who may apply for special votes‖ in terms 
of section 33(1)(b).  
 
During the drafting process of the Electoral Laws Amendment Act 34 of 2003 the Home 
Affairs Portfolio Committee held a briefing on the Bill [B54-03] which took place on 2 
September 2003. In the explanatory memorandum reference was made to the 1998 Electoral 
Act. It was stated that prisoners were not made provision for in the 1998 Act ―probably 
because there was no intention to give prisoners special votes.‖37 Parliament did not give any 
reasons for the implicit exclusion of prisoners from voting, but it can be inferred that 
Parliament excluded prisoners, because it did not want to include prisoners as a class who 
were entitled to a special vote in terms of section 33. Prisoners were absent from their 
ordinary residence which meant that they could only vote in terms of casting a special vote, 
but no provision was made for them to cast special votes in terms of section 33. This implicit 
exclusion of prisoners from voting and the silence of Parliament contained in section 8(2) is 
what gave rise to the August case. 
 
                                                          
37
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‗Electoral Laws Amendment Bill: briefing‘ 2 September 2003 available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030901-electoral-laws-amendment-bill-briefing (accessed 26 July 2014). 
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2.2.4 August v Electoral Commission (1999) 
 
In the August case, a convicted prisoner argued that the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 did not limit 
the right of prisoners to vote, and therefore the Electoral Commission was under an 
obligation to take the necessary steps to enable convicted prisoners to register and vote in 
prison.
38
  Parliament was silent on the issue of the right of prisoners to vote, but besides the 
fact that no provision was made for prisoners in the 1998 Act or in any other legislation or 
regulations, the Commission did not make any arrangements to enable prisoners to register 
and to vote.
39
 
 
The Electoral Commission presented three arguments as to why they did not make 
arrangements for prisoners to vote. These arguments related to fairness, practicality and the 
principle of democracy. With regards to fairness, the Commission argued that prisoners were 
absent from their place of ordinary residence and as a result lost the opportunity to exercise 
their right to vote through their own misconduct.
40
 The Commission argued that special 
measures to accommodate absentee voters should be reserved for voters who are unable to 
vote, because they find themselves in a situation which is not of their own making.
41
 The 
Commission further argued that if special arrangements were made for prisoners, then the 
resources of the Commission would be strained, because they might have to make similar 
arrangements for ―citizens abroad, pilots, long-distance truck drivers, and poor persons living 
in remote areas without public transport.‖42 The argument is thus that it would be unfair to 
make arrangements for prisoners to vote and in the process straining the resources which 
might lead to the Commission not being able to make arrangements for the group of people 
mentioned above. With regards to the practicality argument, the Commission argued that 
making special arrangements for prisoners to register and vote as absentee voters would 
create ―insurmountable logistical, financial and administrative difficulties‖.43 In a nutshell, 
the Commission argued that making arrangements for prisoners to register and vote would 
not be practical, because it will result in the state experiencing various difficulties. 
 
                                                          
38
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [2]. 
39
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [22].    
40
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [20]. 
41
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [8]. 
42
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [30]. 
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 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [8]. 
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The Constitutional Court held that it cannot deny ‗actual claims‘ which were timeously 
asserted by determined people (those of the prisoners), because of the ‗possible existence‘ of 
‗hypothetical claims‘ that ‗might‘ have been brought by indeterminate groups.44 In addition 
the Court held that Parliament cannot, by its silence, deprive a prisoner of the right to vote 
and such silence cannot be interpreted to empower or require the Court or the Commission to 
decide which category of prisoners should be deprived of this right.
45
  
 
With regards to the argument relating to democracy, the issue related to the interpretation of 
the phrase ‗ordinarily resident‘. Counsel for the respondents pointed out that the Commission 
had difficulty in giving the words ‗ordinarily resident‘, as contained in section 7(1)(b) of the 
1998 Act, a meaning.
46
 The question that had to be answered was whether ordinary residence 
is the place where the person was ordinarily resident before he or she was incarcerated, or the 
location of the prison?
47
 The Chairperson of the Electoral Commission averred that whether 
‗ordinarily resident‘ meant the place where a person was resident before he was incarcerated 
or the prison it would present the state and the electoral process with a lot of logistical, 
financial and administrative difficulties.
48
 The question of a concentrated prison electorate 
exercising disproportionate local influence was raised by the Commission in order to cast 
doubt on the interpretation of ‗ordinarily resident‘ meaning the ‗prison‘.49 Treating prisons as 
a place of ordinary residence will not interfere with the outcome of national and provincial 
election; however it will gravely impact local government elections.
50
 Democracy means 
‗self-government‘. The community in which the prison is situated will not be able to govern 
themselves, because prisoners would do it for them and this was anticipated to become a 
serious problem for democracy. The court in this case stated that Parliament must consider 
this issue, thus leaving this issue open and undecided.  
 
The Court held that ―[e]ven on the first interpretation of the phrase, no explanation was 
tendered to show why providing special votes for prisoners was any more difficult than 
providing special votes for the other categories of voters referred to in section 33 of the 1998 
                                                          
44
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [30]. 
45
August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [33]. 
46
 Section 7(1)(b) states that ―[a] person applying for registration as a voter must do so- […] (b) only for the 
voting district in which that person is ordinarily resident.‖ 
47
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [15] 
48
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [13]. 
49
August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [29]. 
50
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [29]. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Electoral Act, such as persons in hospital and diplomats abroad.‖51 In addition the court held 
that ‗ordinarily resident‘ means the prison, as far as prisoners are concerned.52 The reason 
why the Court favoured this interpretation was because ―[w]hen people are imprisoned they 
are forced to leave their homes and to reside in prison. They have no choice.‖53  
 
Many open and democratic societies impose voting disabilities on some categories of 
prisoners.
54
 It is important to understand that the August judgement should not be read as 
suggesting that Parliament may not disenfranchise certain categories of prisoners, however 
Sachs J said that: ―[o]ne should not underestimate the difficulties that would confront the 
legislature, […] in determining whether or not certain classes of prisoners may legitimately 
have their right to vote limited.‖55 The Court thus made it clear that Parliament may 
disenfranchise certain classes of prisoners; however it did not give Parliament any guidance 
as to which prisoners might reasonably be excluded.  The Court also admitted that such a 
consideration might not be an easy one and it acknowledges the fact it would be a difficult 
task for Parliament to make such a classification. 
  
The Court concluded that the applicants were entitled to the remedy they sought.
56
 In doing 
so, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the exclusion of prisoners, should the 
exclusion be properly included in the Electoral Act. The Court did not venture into an 
application of the limitations clause (section 36 of the Constitution), because there was no 
law limiting the right of prisoners to vote.
57
 The actions of the commission, by not making 
provision for prisoners to register and vote, limited their right to vote.  
  
 
                                                          
51
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [13].   
52
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [27]. 
53
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [27]. 
54
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [31]. 
55
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [31] and [32]. 
56
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [36]; the remedy sought by the applicants were for the electoral 
commission to take the necessary steps to enable convicted prisoners to vote in prison . The Constitutional Court 
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In response to the August case Ntusi Mbodla stated: 
 
―The more complex issue of prisoners' voting rights was examined by looking at the nature of 
human and democratic rights as well as the extent to which imprisonment is intended to deprive 
a person of these rights. No strict conclusion could be drawn from this discussion except to 
reject a system whereby disenfranchisement occurred as a circumstantial consequence of 
imprisonment.‖ 58 
 
The August case gave rise to further amendments to the electoral legislation. Parliament 
responded to the August judgment by enacting the Local Government: Municipal Electoral 
Act 27 of 2000 in order to clarify the issue of where prisoners are ‗ordinarily resident‘ for 
purposes of registering and voting in national and provincial elections. In addition, 
Parliament‘s other response to the August judgment took the form of the Electoral Laws 
Amendment Act 34 of 2003, which also addressed the issue of where a prisoner is ‗ordinarily 
resident‘. In addition to this, the Act addressed Parliament‘s silence (as per the 1998 Act) 
regarding enabling prisoners to register and vote. 
 
2.2.5 Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000  
 
This Act was enacted to regulate the second democratic local government elections. It also 
provided for some amendments to the Electoral Act of 1998. The Municipal Electoral Act 
amended the Electoral Act in an attempt to address the issue of where prisoners should 
register and vote. Section 7(1)(b) of the Electoral Act 1998 stated that a person applies for 
registration as a voter only for the voting district in which that person is ‗ordinarily resident‘, 
however the Act did not define where a person‘s ordinary residence is. As far as prisoners are 
concerned the court in August interpreted ‗ordinarily resident‘ to mean the prison where a 
particular person is detained, because when people are imprisoned they have no choice but to 
leave their homes and to reside in prison.
59
 
 
The Municipal Electoral Act amended section 7 of Act 73 of 1998 by inserting the following:  
 
―Section 7(3)(a) A person is regarded to be ordinarily resident at the home or place where that 
person normally lives and to which that person  regularly returns after any period of temporary 
absence. (b) For the purpose of registration on the voters‘ roll a person is not regarded to be 
                                                          
58
 Mbodla N ‗Should Prisoners Have a Right to Vote?‘ (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 102. 
59
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [27]. 
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ordinarily resident at a place where that person is lawfully imprisoned or detained, but at the 
last home or place where that person normally lived when not imprisoned or detained.‖  
 
This provision undid the interpretation provided in August. As far as prisoners were 
concerned the phrase ‗ordinarily resident‘ no longer meant the prison where a person is 
detained but the last home or place where a person normally lived when he or she was not 
imprisoned or detained. 
 
During the drafting process the Home Affairs Portfolio Committee welcomed submissions, 
on 23 May 2000, regarding certain provisions in the Municipal Electoral Bill, one of which 
were section 7. This section dealt with ‗who may vote‘ in municipal elections. When the 
Committee dealt with the question of who may vote, Advocate Lambani stated that those 
imprisoned lawfully on the voting day may not vote.
60
 The reason for this is, because in a 
municipal election one has to vote in the municipality of one‘s residence and this would be 
impossible for prisoners to do.
61
 
 
At public hearings held on 5 June 2000 by the Home Affairs Portfolio Committee it became 
apparent that section 7(1)(b) of the Bill excluded prisoners and those awaiting trial from 
voting in municipal elections.
62
 Mr Butiki Pitikoe presented submissions on behalf of 
Lawyers for Human Rights. They supported this section, arguing that it would cause an 
‗administrative nightmare‘ to permit prisoners and those awaiting trial to vote since most 
prisoners are not incarcerated in the same municipalities in which they reside.
63
 The South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA) stated that not allowing prisoners to vote 
would create the perception that municipal elections were not important.
64
 
 
Mr Pitikoe stated that the Lawyers for Human Rights support voting of prisoners in national 
and provincial elections, but the reason why it does not support such at a local level is 
                                                          
60
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‗Local Government Municipal Electoral Bill: Submission‘ 23 May 2000 
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20000522-municipal-electoral-bill-briefing-and-discussion 
(accessed 1 November 2014). 
61
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‗Local Government Municipal Electoral Bill: Submission‘ 23 May 2000 
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20000522-municipal-electoral-bill-briefing-and-discussion 
(accessed 1 November 2014). 
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 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‗Municipal Electoral Bill: hearings‘ 5 June 2000 available at 
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 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‗Municipal Electoral Bill: hearings‘ 5 June 2000 available at 
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because of the differences between politics at the local level and politics at the National 
level.
65
 Mr Pitikoe made the following statement: 
 
―We believe that allowing prisoners to vote in the municipal elections will unnecessarily 
involve the voting rights of prisoners in controversy. It will make our cause for the vote at 
National Level more difficult to advance in the eyes of the public.‖66 
 
According to him prisoners have no interest in good governance at local level, because their 
interest in clean water and reliable electricity is sufficiently taken care of by the custodial 
duties that the state has in respect of prisoners.
67
 The main reason why Lawyers for Human 
Rights supported the exclusion of prisoners from voting in municipal elections is apparent 
from the following statement made by Mr Pitikoe: 
 
―Prison populations also have the potential to Skew the electoral results in a constituency based 
system. We accept that this would be unreasonable towards the general public who have direct 
and substantial interests in local government affairs.‖68 
 
On 6 June 2000 the Home Affairs Portfolio Committee held deliberations where Adv 
Lambani stated that the Bill was not supposed to give or take away rights, but it was 
supposed to describe the municipal election process in terms of what should be done.
69
 The 
State Law Advisors had some concerns about the constitutionality of section 7(1)(b) and as a 
result they communicated with the IEC regarding the deletion of section 7(1)(b) from the 
Bill.
70
 The IEC proposed a deletion of the section. The position was that no special 
arrangements would be made for prisoners to vote in municipal elections. Mr Mokoena 
responded by saying that the deletion did not take the problem away, because there may still 
be law suits brought by prisoners.
71
 By the time the Bill was presented to government section 
7(1)(b) was deleted, because the clause dealt with the right to vote and this right was in the 
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Constitution and there was no intention to deal with it in the Bill.
72
 Mr Mokoena stated that 
section 7(1)(b) contained a controversial blanket exclusion which included awaiting trial 
prisoners as well and therefore the IEC did not think that the section would survive 
constitutional challenge.
73
 
 
Section 7(1)(b) was deleted from the Bill thus the provision never made it into the Act. The 
general understanding is that prisoners cannot vote in municipal elections. The Commission 
has on occasion stated that prisoners can register while in prison to enable them to vote in 
national and provincial elections only, meaning that they cannot do so for municipal 
elections.
74
 The position is thus the same as that which gave rise to the August case in relation 
to National and Provincial elections, where Parliament was silent on whether prisoners could 
vote or not. 
 
As far as the arrangement for casting a special vote is concerned, section 55 of the Act stated 
the following: 
 
―The Commission may not make any special arrangements whereby a person is allowed to vote 
on any day other than voting day or at any place other than the voting station or a mobile voting 
station established for the voting, district in which that person is registered as a voter.‖ 
 
This section prohibited the commission from making any special arrangements for anyone to 
cast his or her vote. Parliament realised the harshness of this provision and amended it in 
2010 through the enactment of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Amendment Act 
14 of 2010. Act 14 of 2010 amended Act 27 of 2000 by deleting the words as found in 
section 55 and substituting it with the following: 
 
―Any voter who is unable, on voting day, to cast his or her vote at the voting station in the 
voting district where he or she is registered, may in the prescribed manner apply and be 
allowed, prior to voting day, to cast a special vote within that voting district.‖ 
 
The Act is silent on whether prisoners would be permitted to cast a special vote in municipal 
elections. 
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2.2.6 Electoral Laws Amendment Act 34 of 2003 
 
The Electoral Laws Amendment Act 34 of 2003 amended the Electoral Act in various ways, 
however only some amendments are relevant to prisoners‘ voting rights. Section 4 of Act 34 
of 2003 amended section 8 of Act 73 of 1998 by inserting section 8(2)(f) which provided the 
following: 
 
―The chief electoral officer may not register a person as a voter if that person is serving a 
sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine.‖ 
 
In addition, Act 34 of 2003 amended Act 73 of 1998 by inserting section 24B which contains 
the heading ―Prisoners‖. Section 24B (1) and (2) provides the following: 
 
―(1) In an election for the National Assembly or a provincial legislature, a person who on 
election day is in prison and not serving a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a 
fine and whose name appears on the voters‘ roll for another voting district, is deemed for that 
election day to have been registered by his or her name having been entered on the voters’ 
roll for the voting district in which he or she is in prison. (2) A person who is in prison on 
election day may only vote if he or she is not serving a sentence of imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.‖ 
 
Section 24B(1) restored the position in August regarding the fact that citizens should register 
and vote where they are ‗ordinarily resident‘. In terms of this section prisoners are deemed to 
have been registered in the district in which they are in prison, provided that they are not 
serving a prison sentence without the option of a fine. Section 24B(2) on the other hand 
contains the position of the 1979 Electoral Act and the 1993 Act in as far as the 
disenfranchisement of those prisoners serving prison sentence without the option of a fine are 
concerned.  
 
2.2.7 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) 
 
The amendments by Act 34 of 2003 gave rise to the NICRO case. In this case the National 
Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (Nicro) and two convicted 
prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment lodged an application for an order declaring 
sections 8(2)(f), and 24B(1) and (2) of Act 1998, as amended by Act 2003, which deprived 
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convicted prisoners of the right to participate in elections, to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid.
75
  
 
The question was raised as to whether legislation disqualifying prisoners or categories of 
prisoners from voting could be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. The government 
tried to justify the exclusion of all convicted prisoners (who did not have the option of paying 
a fine) on similar grounds as those which surfaced in August. The government‘s arguments, 
as in August, related to practicality, fairness and a new crime prevention and deterrent ground 
made its appearance.  
 
With regards to the practicality (logistics and cost) argument, the Minister submitted that in 
making provision for mobile voting stations in prison involves risking the integrity of the 
voting process, because of the fact that arrangements have to be made for the storage and 
transport of such votes.
76
 The Minister further argued that special arrangements like this puts 
strain on the logistical and financial resources which are available to the Electoral 
Commission for purposes of conducting the elections.
77
 The Court responded to this by 
stating that no factual basis was provided for the logistical argument, because there was no 
information before the court that suggested that an undue burden would be placed on the 
resources of the state.
78
 The court rejected this argument. 
 
With regards to the argument relating to fairness the Minister‘s submission related to the fact 
that, according to the state, it would not be fair if prisoners were to be seen as being favoured 
above others who also have difficulty making it to the polling stations. He argued that special 
arrangements for voting could be made, but only for certain classes of people, which 
excluded prisoners and the categories of people for whom special arrangements had to be 
made had to be limited.
79
 He made the argument that there are other categories of persons 
who, for good reasons, cannot get to registration and voting stations and that the state‘s 
resources should be used to enable law abiding citizens to register and vote and should not be 
at the disposal of convicted prisoners.
80
 The Court responded to this argument by stating that 
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it has no substance.
81
 The court substantiated in saying that prisoners are prevented from 
voting by the Electoral Act and the actions of the state therefore their position cannot be 
compared to people whose freedom has not been curtailed by law and who require special 
arrangements to be made in order for them to vote.
82
  
 
On the grounds of crime prevention and deterrence the Minister argued that if our country, 
where there are strong feelings against the high level of crime, were to allow convicted 
prisoners to vote it would send an incorrect message to the public that the government is soft 
on crime.
83
 The Court rejected this argument stating that ―[a] fear that the public may 
misunderstand the government‘s true attitude to crime and criminals provides no basis for 
depriving prisoners of fundamental rights that they retain despite their incarceration.‖84 With 
regards to this argument the Court assumed that the government intended to convey ―[t]hat at 
the level of policy it is important for the government to denounce crime and to communicate 
to the public that the rights that citizens have are related to their duties and obligations as 
citizens.  Such a purpose would be legitimate and consistent with the provisions of section 3 
of the Constitution [which deals with the rights and duties of citizenship].‖85 Pierre De Vos is 
of the opinion that this was indeed one of the arguments by the Minister even though the 
court assumed it to be. He is of the opinion that this is an argument by implication.
86
 I am of 
the opinion that the state failed to argue that a citizen‘s rights are related to their duties and 
should not be implied, thus the question that the Court could not answer was whether 
government, as a matter of policy, could adopt the stance that the rights of citizens are related 
to their duties (enhancing respect for the rule of law)?
87
 The reason why the Court could not 
answer this question was, because the policy issue was not properly argued by the 
government thus leaving the court with insufficient information to answer this question.  
 
The Court noted that no information was put before it about the sort of offences for which 
shorter periods of imprisonment are likely to be imposed, the sort of persons who are likely to 
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be imprisoned for such offences, and the number of persons who might lose their vote 
because of comparatively minor transgressions.
88
  It thus held the following: ―we have wholly 
inadequate information on which to conduct the limitation analysis that is called for‖89. It also 
pointed out the fact that the provisions which appear in the 1998 Act as a result of the 2003 
amendment Act appear to disenfranchise prisoners whose convictions and sentences are 
under appeal.
90
 
 
The Court concluded that the provisions introduced by Act 34 of 2003 were unconstitutional, 
because it was in violation of the right to vote and the Minister of Home Affairs failed to 
justify this violation.
91
 It should be noted that the court did not decide the matter as to the 
voting rights of prisoners in general, thus it did not resolve the issue of prisoner 
disenfranchisement. It just focussed on the justification given by the state for limiting the 
right to vote of those prisoners who were sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a 
fine and based on that it found that the violation was unconstitutional. The question still 
remains; would the exclusion of all prisoners or certain classes of prisoners be 
unconstitutional? Could there ever be a justifiable reason for the exclusion? 
 
Chaskalson CJ, who wrote the majority judgment, raised the issue relating to the fact that the 
Electoral Act 73 of 1998 (as amended by Act 34 of 2003) prohibited prisoners sentenced to 
imprisonment without the option of a fine from voting while our Constitution permits a 
prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment of less than 12 months without the option of a 
fine to stand for public office.
92
 This meant that a person sentenced to prison for less than a 
year without the option of a fine, could stand for public office, but at the same time could not 
vote. What the Court did was to suggest section 47(1)(e) as an example of the kind of 
prisoner exclusion that might pass the test of constitutionality. This means that the majority 
of the Court has left the question open. This still leaves the constitutionality of a properly 
crafted exclusion undecided.  
 
Madala J wrote a dissenting judgment. He held that even though there was a lack of evidence 
before the court to enable it to do a limitation analysis, this lack of evidence does not 
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necessarily result in invalidity of the impugned provision.
93
 He disagreed with the findings 
and conclusion which the majority reached, particularly on the lack of justification for the 
infringement of the right to vote.
94
 According to Madala J the temporary removal of the right 
to vote of certain categories of prisoners is in line with the government objective of balancing 
individual rights and the values of our society. He felt strongly about not rewarding a person, 
who has no respect for the law, the right and responsibility of voting.
95
 
 
Ngcobo J also wrote a dissenting judgment. In his opinion the policy which the government is 
trying to pursue is one of denouncing crime and sending a message to criminals that the rights 
citizens have are related to their duties and obligations as citizens.
96
 He was of the opinion 
that the government had a legitimate purpose in pursuing a policy of denouncing crime and to 
promote a culture of the observance of civic duties and obligations.
97
 Our Constitution does 
not take kindly to crime, Ngcobo J pointed out that this is apparent from section 47(1)(e) of 
the Constitution which disqualifies any person who is convicted of an offence and sentenced 
to more than 12 months imprisonment without the option of a fine from membership of the 
National Assembly.
98
  There is a similar disqualification from membership in the provincial 
parliament and the local government. He also pointed out an important issue which 
parliament overlooked. The limitation on prisoners‘ voting rights makes no distinction 
between those prisoners who are serving a prison sentence while awaiting the outcome of an 
appeal and those whose appeals have been finalised. According to him ―[t]his distinction is 
important because the former may still be found not guilty on appeal or have their sentence 
reduced to a prison sentence with an option of a fine. If an outcome of the appeal comes after 
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the elections, the person would have been wrongly deprived of the right to vote.‖99 He 
correctly held that to this extent the limitation goes too far, because it does not make the 
distinction which the Constitution makes (section 47 (1)(e)).
100
 He concluded by saying the 
following: 
 
―[…] this defect is in my view of the kind that could adequately be cured by reading in the 
following qualifying phrase: “but no one may be regarded as having been sentenced until an 
appeal against the conviction or sentence has been determined, or until the time for an appeal 
has expired”, after the phrase “serving a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a 
fine”, into the provisions.‖101 
 
Ngcobo J suggested that by reading the above phrase into the Electoral Act will solve the 
problem which the Act created by not stating the position of those prisoners who are awaiting 
the outcome of their appeals. He merely mentioned that section 47(1)(e) demonstrates that 
crime will not be tolerated. He thus hinted that a provision similar to section 47(1)(e) of the 
Constitution could be an example of prisoner disenfranchisement which will pass 
constitutional muster, however he proposed the reading in of the above phrase instead of the 
provision contained in section 47(1)(e). The following phrase is thus not what Ngcobo J 
proposed to be read-in ―convicted of an offence and sentenced to more than 12 months 
imprisonment without the option of a fine‖. Enacting the provision of section 47(1)(e), which 
relate to passive voting rights, as the provision which disenfranchises prisoners would have 
been the ideal remedy for active voting rights, because it would limit the disenfranchisement 
to some prisoners and not all. It also limits the disenfranchisement to those who committed 
the more serious offences, because a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year can be 
presumed to be a serious offence in our law. 
 
After the two judgments, academics expressed the fact that there is still some uncertainty as 
to the status of prisoner voting rights. In response to August and NICRO, Brickhill & Babiuch 
are of the opinion that all that can be said with certainty is that the active voting rights of 
prisoners cannot be excluded based on logistical or financial considerations. Beyond this 
minimum, they correctly regard the issue as undecided:  
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―It remains an open question, however, whether more narrowly tailored ban on prisoner voting 
rights – such as disenfranchising only those prisoners found guilty of a certain category of more 
serious crimes – may be constitutionally permissible.‖102 
 
In both cases the Court does not support or take away from the principle of democracy which 
is contained in the constitutional text (section 1(d)).
103
 Theunis Roux is of the opinion that: 
 
―At best, [our courts/judges] are agnostic on the question whether that principle can be enforced 
in cases where the state does not act irrationally.‖104 
 
This means that our courts are uncertain or does not know how to apply the principle of 
democracy. For Theunis Roux the principle of democracy appears ―blush‖.105  
 
As a result of the NICRO judgment the electoral commission made provision for all convicted 
prisoners to register and vote in the 2004 and 2009 national and provincial elections. ―No 
distinction was made between sentenced and awaiting-trial prisoners or between the different 
categories of sentenced prisoners.‖106 Parliament responded to the Court‘s ruling in NICRO 
by passing the Electoral Amendment Act 18 of 2013. 
 
2.2.8 Electoral Amendment Act 18 of 2013 
 
The 2013 Act, like the 1998 version of the Act, did not exclude any classes of prisoners from 
voting in the National and Provincial election which was held on 7 May 2014. Section 3 of 
Act 18 of 2013 deleted section 8(2)(f) from Act 73 of 1998, meaning that no provision exists 
which prohibits the chief electoral officer from registering a person as a voter even if that 
person is serving a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine. Section 5 of Act 18 
of 2013 amended section 24B of Act 73 of 1998 by deleting the words ―and not serving a 
sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine‖ from section 24B(1) and by deleting 
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section 24B(2) in its entirety.  After this amendment, section 24B (1) of the Electoral Act 73 
of 1998 (as amended by Act 18 of 2013) now reads as follows:  
 
―In an election for the National Assembly or a provincial legislature, a person who on election 
day is in prison and whose name appears on the voters' roll for another voting district, is 
deemed for that election day to have been registered by his or her name having been entered on 
the voters' roll for the voting district in which he or she is in prison.‖ 
 
When the Electoral Amendment Act, 2013 was still in Bill form the public were given the 
opportunity to make submissions and the Electoral Commission responded to such 
submissions on 16 September 2013. The Electoral Commission submitted that there should 
not be a problem regarding prisoner disenfranchisement because the Constitutional Court 
expressed itself on the matter.
107
 This shows that the Commission does not have any 
reservations about the approach which the Constitutional Court used in deciding the issue of 
prisoner enfranchisement. At the Second reading debate on the Electoral Amendment Bill [B 
22 –2013] on 19 September 2013 Mr MW Thring spoke on behalf of the African Christian 
Democratic Party, in saying that the party has its reservations about permitting convicted 
prisoners to vote, however the party respects the decision of the Constitutional Court in this 
regard.
108
 There was thus a general acceptance of the Court‘s judgment. 
  
2.2.9 First interim conclusion 
 
In August the Constitutional Court already confirmed that it is not taking the position that 
disenfranchising prisoners would in general be unconstitutional. The Court thus meant that 
prisoners could be disenfranchised as long as it is not a blanket exclusion. In NICRO, on the 
other hand, the Court found that it was unconstitutional to disenfranchise all prisoners serving 
a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine. The Court‘s reason for this finding 
was because this exclusion was too broad to the extent than it included the commission of any 
crime and a sentence of any length. The question left open is thus which type of prisoner 
exclusions would be constitutional. Would it be constitutional if the exclusion in terms of 
active voting right mirrored the exclusion in terms of passive voting rights, as contained in 
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section 47(1)(e)? As suggested by Chaskalson J and Ngcobo J an exclusion of prisoners from 
voting might be constitutional if it mirrored the exclusion contained in section 47(1)(e). For 
this reason an assessment of the passive voting rights in South Africa is done in the next 
section of this chapter. 
 
2.3 The passive voting rights of prisoners in South Africa (1994-2014) 
 
Provision is made for passive voting rights in section 19(3)(b), section 47(1)(e), section 61(1) 
read with section 106(1)(e) and section 158(1)(c) of the Constitution.
109
  Section 19(3)(b) 
states: 
  
―Every adult citizen has the right to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.‖  
 
Much emphasis will be put on section 47(1)(e), because the majority of political disputes, 
regarding people who stand for or hold a public office with a criminal record, has been 
regarding section 47(1)(e). It is, however, important to note that section 47(1)(e), section 
61(1) read with section 106(1)(e) and section 158(1)(c) contain the same provision. The 
Municipal Electoral Act prescribes in section 17(2)(f) that a person who is about to stand as 
ward councillor is required to submit a prescribed declaration,  which is signed by him or 
herself,  stating that he or she is not disqualified from standing for election in terms of the 
Constitution or any applicable legislation. Section 27(2)(b) of the Electoral Act contains a 
similar provision which relates to the National and Provincial legislatures. 
 
In order to put the current position regarding passive voting rights into context it will suffice 
to have a look at the last Apartheid era Constitution and the Interim Constitution. The last 
apartheid era Constitution, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, in 
section 54(1)(a), made provision for the exclusion of a person from standing for public office 
if that person was convicted of an offence and sentenced to prison. Section 54(1)(a) provided 
the following: 
  
―No person shall be capable of being elected or nominated or of sitting as a member of a House 
if he has at any time been convicted of any offence for which he has been sentenced to 
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imprisonment without the option of a fine for a period of not less than twelve months, unless 
he has received a grant of amnesty or a free pardon, or unless the period of such imprisonment 
expired at least five years before the date of his election or nomination‖. 
  
The Interim Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, 
also made provision for the exclusion of person serving a prison sentence of more than 12 
month from standing for public office. Section 42(1)(b)provided the following: 
  
―No person shall become or remain a member of the National Assembly if he or she is 
convicted of an offence in the Republic for which he or she has been sentenced to 
imprisonment of more than 12 months without the option of a fine, unless he or she has 
received a pardon.‖ 
  
The current Constitution, section 47(1) disqualifies the following people from being members 
of the National Assembly: 
 
 ―(a) anyone who is appointed by, or is in the service of, the state and receives remuneration for 
that appointment or service, other than- (i) the President. Deputy President, Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers; and (ii) other office-bearers whose functions are compatible with the 
functions of a member of the Assembly, and have been declared compatible with those 
functions by national legislation; (b) permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces 
or members of a provincial legislature or a Municipal Council; (c) un-rehabilitated insolvents; 
(d) anyone declared to be of unsound mind by a court of the Republic; or (e) anyone who, after 
this section took effect, is convicted of an offence and sentenced to more than 12 months 
imprisonment without the option of a fine, either in the Republic, or outside the Republic if 
the conduct constituting the offence would have been an offence in the Republic, but no one 
may be regarded as having been sentenced until an appeal against the conviction or sentence 
has been determined, or until the time for an appeal has expired. A disqualification under 
this paragraph ends five years after the sentence has been completed.‖110 
 
The relevant disqualification, section 47(1)(e) provides that a citizen is excluded from 
standing for public office in the National Assembly if such citizen is convicted of an offence 
and sentenced to more than 12 month‘s imprisonment without the option of a fine; such 
disqualification ends five years after the sentence has been completed.  
 
The 1993 Constitution only excluded a particular individual from standing for public office 
while he or she is in prison, where as the 1983 Constitution excluded an individual during the 
period of serving his or her prison sentence up until five years after his or her release. The 
1983 provision was thus re-enacted into the 1996 Constitution to the extent that a person‘s 
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exclusion from public office ends five years after the completion of his or her prison 
sentence. 
 
With regards to the position under the current Constitution, there has been much debate about 
the interpretation of section 47(1)(e). The issue regarding the interpretation of this section 
was dealt with in a case that came before the Electoral Commission where the political party, 
Freedom Front Plus, objected to the nomination of Mrs Winnie Mandela as a candidate in the 
election of 22 November 2009.
111
 The Commission rejected this objection and this rejection 
led to an appeal being made to the Electoral Court of South Africa. The appellant contended 
that Mrs Mandela is disqualified from standing for public office, because of ―a sentence of 
imprisonment of more than twelve months imposed on her in July 2004, even though the 
whole of the sentence was suspended on certain conditions.‖112 This sentence was as a result 
of her fraud and theft conviction. Freedom Front Plus argued that the word ‗imprisonment‘ 
referred to in section 47(1)(e) includes a suspended term of imprisonment.
113
 The court held 
that  Mrs Mandela ―is not disqualified from standing as a candidate for election on 22 April 
2009 as she was not sentenced to an effective term of imprisonment, capable of being 
‗completed‘ within the meaning of section 47(1)(e).‖114 This is so because section 47(1)(e) 
provides that the disqualification from standing for public office ends five years after the 
sentence has been ‗completed‘ and a suspended sentence cannot be completed, but it 
‗expires‘.115 The court came to its conclusion by using section 9 of the Constitution. It held 
that ―a person who commits a more serious offence for which he or she serves a prison term 
of twelve months would be eligible to hold public office much earlier than a person who did 
not actually serve a prison term, but his or her sentence suspended for a period of five years 
for example. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature, namely to 
encourage uneven treatment of its citizens in violation of the equal protection provisions of 
section 9 of the Constitution.‖116 
 
Academics such as Pierre de Vos are of the opinion that if one looks at the plain language of 
the Constitutional text, the drafters ―clearly wanted to make sure that recently convicted 
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crooks are prevented from representing us in Parliament.‖117 He is of the opinion that, even if 
one gets a sentence of imprisonment of more than 12 months without the option of paying a 
fine and such sentence is suspended, it is still covered by section 47(1)(e) even though no 
actual prison term were carried out.
118
 This interpretation by De Vos is as result of the case of 
Mrs Mandela who became a Member of Parliament despite this provision, thus it shows that 
in past practice the interpretation of De Vos were rejected. I agree with the interpretation of 
De Vos, because of the fact that the person who gets the sentence must have committed a 
crime serious enough to warrant a sentence of imprisonment and should not be allowed to 
stand for public office and represent the people (citizens). These are the people who will 
make the laws of the country; do we really want to leave the responsibility of making the 
laws to criminals? However, all is not lost to these individuals and they are not excluded 
forever, because their passive voting rights are restored five years after the completion of 
their sentence.  
 
2.3.1 Second preliminary conclusion 
 
Prisoner disenfranchisement as contained in the Electoral legislation of the country has been 
found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court without any proclamation as to what 
type of prisoner disenfranchisement would pass constitutional muster. Chaskalson J and 
Ngcobo J merely hinted that section 47(1)(e) of the Constitution, containing the passive 
voting exclusion, might be an example of an exclusion which would pass constitutional 
muster as far as active voting is concerned. The legislation was thus measured against the 
Constitution. The determination which has to be made now is whether the Constitutional 
provision, section 47(1)(e), is in line with Human Rights standards under the African Charter. 
The question is thus whether the African Court of Human Rights has decided the status of 
prisoners‘ voting rights.  
 
2.4 Prisoners’ voting rights under the African Charter  
 
The South African Constitutional Court has not yet determined the status of prisoners‘ voting 
rights, thus it would be best to look at the position under the African Charter to determine 
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such status. The African Union caters for African countries which are member countries of 
the union and it has a Commission which ensures the protection of human and peoples‘ rights 
as laid down in the Charter.
119
 South Africa is a member state of the African Union and is  
party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,
120
 meaning that the country, 
through its representatives, signed the charter and thus consented to adhere to the provisions 
of the charter. South Africa is also bound by the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance.
121
  
 
Article 13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights is the relevant article as 
far as voting rights is concerned. Article 13(1) provided the following: 
 
―Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the 
law.‖122  
 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance also contains certain 
provisions relating to political rights of citizens. This Charter is a binding legal instrument 
which South Africa signed and ratified in 2010. It addresses elements which are necessary for 
the establishment of liberal democracies.
123
 Some of the objectives of this charter include 
promoting adherence, by states, to principles and values of democracy and respect for human 
rights; promoting regular free and fair elections and promoting the establishment of 
conditions which are necessary to foster citizen participation.
124
  Under this charter, state 
parties agree to recognise participation through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of 
the people.
125
 Member states of the African Union commit themselves to certain rights and 
obligations under which democratic elections are conducted such as recognising that ―every 
citizen has the right to fully participate in the electoral processes of the country, including the 
right to vote or be voted for, according to the laws of the country and as guaranteed by the 
Constitution, without any kind of discrimination.‖126  
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In terms of the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa the 
countries who are members of the African Union reaffirms, in Declaration IV (1) and (2), the 
following rights and obligations under which democratic elections are conducted: 
 
 ―(1) Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his or her 
country, either directly or through freely elected representatives in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. (2) Every citizen has the right to fully participate in the electoral 
processes of the country, including the right to vote or be voted for, according to the laws of the 
country and as guaranteed by the Constitution, without any kind of discrimination.‖ 127 
 
The African Court of Human Rights have not yet been faced with a case regarding active 
voting rights of prisoners, thus there is no answer in regional law regarding the status of 
prisoner disenfranchisement. The closest the Court has come to dealing with a matter 
regarding voting rights is the case of Rev Mtikila v Tanzania.
128
 This case relates to passive 
voting rights; however it is not a case regarding prisoners‘ passive voting rights. 
 
Mtikila instituted proceedings against the Tanzanian government claiming that it had, through 
certain Constitutional amendments to its Constitution, violated its citizens‘ right of freedom 
of association, the right to participate in public/governmental affairs and the right against 
discrimination by prohibiting independent candidates to contest Presidential, Parliamentary 
and Local Government elections.
129
 The Eight Constitutional Amendment Act of Tanzania 
required that any candidate for Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government elections 
had to be a member of, and be sponsored by, a political party.
130
  
 
Mtikila requested the court to declare that the Tanzanian government violated Article 13(1) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights.131 The Court held that the rights 
guaranteed under the Charter as stated in Article 13(1) are individual rights.
132
 The court 
noted that what had to be determined was whether or not an individual right has been placed 
into jeopardy, or otherwise violated, not whether or not groups may enjoy the particular 
right.
133
 The Court held the following: 
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―[…] a requirement that a candidate must belong to a political party before she is enabled to 
participate in the governance of Tanzania surely derogates from the rights enshrined in Article 
13(1) of the Charter.‖134 
 
The Court looked at Article 27(2) which provides for the limitation of rights and freedoms. 
This provision requires a limitation to take the form of a law of general application and this 
limitation must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
135
 The Court held that there 
were no evidence to show that ―the restrictions on the exercise of the right to participate 
freely in the government of the country by prohibiting independent candidates falls within the 
permissible restrictions set out in Article 27(2) of the Charter […] the restriction on the 
exercise of the right through the prohibition on independent candidacy is not proportionate to 
the alleged aim of fostering national unity and solidarity.‖136 
 
The Court held that Article 13(1) reserves the right to a citizen to participate directly or 
through representatives in government and any law which requires a citizen to be part of a 
political party before he or she can become a presidential candidate is a restraint which denies 
the citizen the right of direct participation, and this amounts to a violation.
137
 The court found 
that there was a violation of the right to participate freely in the government of one‘s 
country.
138
  
 
The South African Constitution allows for the exclusion of prisoners in as far as in relates to 
their passive voting rights (i.e. section 47(1)(e)). In order to determine the validity of these 
provisions, limiting the passive voting rights of citizens, one has to test these provisions 
against the African Charter and the decisions handed down by the African Court. There is 
nothing in the Charter and the Mtikila case that suggests that the sections in the South African 
Constitution, as far as passive voting rights are concerned, are inconsistent with the charter. 
The question still remains; what is the status of voting rights of convicted prisoners, because 
the Mtikila case has not answered any questions relating to prisoner voting rights? 
Because the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights, respectively, has till this day not dealt with a case relating to 
prisoner disenfranchisement, it means that the issues relating to prisoner disenfranchisement 
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have only been dealt with on a national level by the member countries. This issue was 
addressed by Adem Abebe in an article. He examined the extent to which international 
human rights law recognises the right of prisoners to vote.
139
 He examined the position which 
the European Court of Human Rights takes on the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement. He 
then discussed the two South African cases August and NICRO. He found that both the South 
African Constitutional Court and the European Court takes the position that criminal 
disenfranchisement can be legitimate in certain cases; because it ensures respect of civil 
duties.
140
 In addition the two Courts‘ position is that an automatic ban is disproportionate.141 
Ncgobo J, in the NICRO case, proposed that legislation which disenfranchises prisoners 
should be invalid to the extent that it does not distinguish between ‗those prisoners who are 
serving a prison sentence while awaiting the outcome of an appeal and those whose appeals 
have been finalised‘.142 Abebe is of the opinion that ―it will be interesting to see if Justice 
Ngcobo‘s calculations will be relied on in future cases in the European Court and the African 
Human Rights Committee.‖143 
 
According to Abebe, the desire of countries to inculcate a sense of civic responsibility in 
prisoners has been the principal justification for continued criminal disenfranchisement.
144
 He 
opposes criminal disenfranchisement as additional punishment, because he is of the view that 
it does not serve as a deterrent and that criminals will not be deterred by the threat of 
disenfranchisement.
145
 He is of the opinion that disenfranchisement is at the bottom of any 
‗calculated risk‘ taken by prospective criminals.146 
 
He concludes by saying the following: 
 
―There is currently nothing at the African regional level that can help to clarify the uncertainty 
in relation to the status of the right of prisoners to vote […] Although the right to vote is an 
established right in the African human rights system, neither the African Charter, nor other 
African human rights instruments, provide sufficient guidance on the extent to which the 
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suffrage should be universal […] The African Commission has also not addressed the issue in 
its resolutions and concluding observations.‖147 
 
In addition he recommends that human rights activists and civil society organisations submit 
complaints to the African Commission and to the Court, challenging criminal 
disenfranchisement laws based on the right to political participation under article 13 of the 
African Charter.
148
 He proposes that the Commission adopt a resolution on the extent to 
which criminal disenfranchisement laws are compatible with the Charter and the best way to 
address this uncertainty is to submit an advisory opinion to the court.
149
 
 
2.5 Third preliminary conclusion 
 
Roux is of the opinion that a deep reading of the principle of democracy has not yet been 
confirmed by a majority of the Constitutional Court in South Africa. He states the following: 
 
 ―The constitutional text clearly supports a deep reading of [the principle of democracy] that 
conforms to accounts of democracy in political theory which insist that, for democracy to be 
meaningful, government must facilitate real public participation in decision-making and 
genuine deliberation.‖150  
 
The South African Constitutional Court and the African Court of Human Rights have not 
finalised the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement. It seems as if the constitutional provision, 
section 47(1)(e), is in line with the African Charter because the African Court have not 
indicated otherwise. Thus it seems that section 47(1)(e) would pass constitutional muster if 
enacted as the provision which excludes the affected prisoners from voting.  
 
What the Constitutional Court clarified, in both August and NICRO, was that it will not 
accept arguments regarding logistical, financial and administrative difficulties as reasons for 
the disenfranchisement of prisoners. The government based the disenfranchisement of 
prisoners on the shortage of logistical and financial resources of the state and the Court 
rejected these arguments. In NICRO the government submitted that the aim of 
disenfranchising convicted prisoners was to serve as a crime prevention and deterrent 
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measure. The Court made it clear that, with regards to the crime prevention and deterrent 
aims of disenfranchisement, it would accept such a purpose as legitimate.
151
 With regards to 
the proportionality factor, the Court found that in disenfranchising all prisoners serving a 
sentence of imprisonment is not proportional. It based this on three factors, the length of the 
prison sentence, the type of offence and the consideration of appeals which have not yet been 
finalised. The Court held that no information was put before it about the sort of offences for 
which shorter periods of imprisonment are likely to be imposed, the sort of persons who are 
likely to be imprisoned for such offences, and the number of persons who might lose their 
vote because of comparatively minor transgressions.
152
 It also pointed out the fact that section 
24B(2) of the 1998 Act, as amended by the 2003 amendment Act, disenfranchise prisoners 
whose convictions and sentences are under appeal.
153
 
 
In attempting to determine the status of prisoner disenfranchisement, by having a look at 
regional law, no answers were produced. Neither the African Charter nor the African Court 
shed some light on such status and for this reason a comparative look beyond African system 
is required. In the following chapter, in another attempt to find an answer regarding the status 
of prisoners‘ voting rights, an assessment of UK law will take place.  The focus will be on 
prisoners‘ voting rights in UK, England and the European Convention and voting rights of 
prisoners under the Convention. In this chapter the tension between UK law and European 
Human Rights Law will be illustrated. The following chapter contains an assessment of 
prisoner voting rights cases, as handed down by the European Court of Human Rights, which 
is an attempt to determine which prisoner disenfranchisement laws, are permitted. This will 
assist in making a recommendation for the reform of the South African electoral law. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
PRISONERS’ VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the voting rights of prisoners in the United Kingdom and in the European 
Union will be discussed. This discussion will be limited to one of the four United Kingdom 
countries, England. The discussion will also be limited to and will focus on the development 
of the law as from 1998 till 2014. The reason for this is, because of the fact that the United 
Kingdom does not have a written Constitution and it enacted the Human Rights Act, 1998 to 
codify certain rights and freedoms. 
 
The laws relevant to prisoner voting will be outlined, as this was analysed in the case 
discussions. The United Kingdom position on voting rights of prisoners will be discussed in 
light of the case of Hirst v Attorney General (2001). After this discussion a discussion of 
voting rights of prisoners, as it is found under the European Convention and as the issue was 
addressed by the European Court of Human Rights, will be discussed and assessed. This will 
be done by analysing some of the major cases regarding prisoner disenfranchisement, 
including Hirst v the United Kingdom (2005). The importance of these cases is the manner in 
which the European Court interpreted and applied Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European 
Convention, which contains the right to vote and to be voted for. A discussion of passive 
voting rights as found in the United Kingdom will follow. The eligibility of candidates who 
want to stand for public office will be outlined, thus focussing on the passive voting rights. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse electoral legislation and to determine the status of 
prisoner voting rights in the United Kingdom and in the European Union. Another purpose of 
this chapter is to assess the approach which the United Kingdom Courts and European Court 
took in determining the validity of disenfranchising legislation. This purpose will assist in 
making a determination as to what aims the Court accepts as legitimate aims which the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners tries to achieve. In addition, a determination will be made as 
to the factors which played a role in the application of the proportionality assessment.  
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3.2 The active voting rights of prisoners in the United Kingdom (1998-2014) 
 
It is important to note that the United Kingdom has an ‗unwritten‘ Constitution which is why 
Douglas Vick refers to the Constitution as an ‗odd‘ one.154 This means that provision is made 
for particular rights and freedoms in Acts of Parliament. Those relevant to voting rights, in 
particular that of prisoners will be looked at and discussed below. The legislation as it is 
found presently will be discussed in order to get a sense as to what is contained in these laws 
that gave rise to the dispute in the Hirst case. 
 
3.2.1 Representation of the People Act 1968, 1969, 1983 and 2000 
 
The Representation of the People Act was enacted after it was recommended at a multi-party 
Speaker's conference, on Electoral Law, in 1968 that a convicted prisoner who is in custody 
should not be entitled to vote.
155
 This prohibition was initially enacted by section 4 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1969 where after it was re-enacted by section 3(1) of the 
1983 Act.
156
 The Representation of the People Act 1983 currently governs elections in the 
United Kingdom. Section 3(1) if the Act states the following: 
 
―A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his 
sentence or unlawfully at large when he would otherwise be so detained is legally incapable of 
voting at any parliamentary or local government election.‖157 
 
In 1999 the government recommended that ―remand prisoners and mental patients (other than 
those in custody who have been convicted) should be allowed to vote.‖158 This 
recommendation was enacted in the Representation of the People Act 2000. Act 2000 
amended Act 1983 by inserting section 3A into the Act. Section 3A states the following: 
 
―(1) A person to whom this section applies is, during the time that he is— (a) detained at any 
place in pursuance of the order or direction by virtue of which this section applies to him, or (b) 
unlawfully at large when he would otherwise be so detained—legally incapable of voting at any 
parliamentary or local government election.‖ 
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During the time that the 2000 Act was debated in the House of Commons Mr Howarth, for 
the government, maintained the view that losing rights, one of which is the right to vote, is 
part of a convicted prisoner's punishment.
159
 
 
It would at this point be fitting to have a look at the relevant provisions of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights and the relation between the two. 
 
3.2.2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The United Kingdom has an unwritten Constitution and the Human Rights Act, which came 
into force in 1998, was an attempt by the UK government to codify and give a formal legal 
status to essential rights and freedoms as contained in the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
160
 Douglas Vick pronounces that ―[the] Act represents a culmination of a long-
running constitutional debate in the United Kingdom over whether to adopt a Bill of 
Rights.‖161 The relevant provision in the European Convention is Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
which deals with the ―Right to Free Elections‖ and it provides the following: 
 
―The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature.‖ 
 
In the Preamble of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is stated that the Act‘s purpose is ―to give 
further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human 
Rights…‖ The relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 are sections 1 and 4. 
Section 1(1) states the following: 
 
―In this Act ―the Convention rights‖ means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in— 
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, (b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and (c) 
Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.‖ 
 
Section 4 on the other hand gives the United Kingdom domestic courts the authority to make 
a declaration of incompatibility of any law of the United Kingdom to the extent that it is 
incompatible with the European Convention. Section 4(1) and (2) are the relevant provisions 
and they state the following: 
                                                          
159
 Hirst v Attorney General (2001) at [8]. 
160
 Adopted in Rome on 4 November 1950. 
161
 Vick D ‗The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution‘ (2002) 329-330. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
―(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision 
of primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right. (2) If the court is satisfied that the 
provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that 
incompatibility.‖ 
 
The law as outlined above were the ones which the UK High Court and the European Court 
of Human Rights considered and assessed before delivering their judgments in the different 
Hirst judgments. The debate surrounding this legislation is clearly set out below. 
 
3.2.3 Hirst v Attorney General (2001) 
 
Mr Hirst, who is a British national from England, pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the 
ground of diminished capacity and was sentenced to a term of discretionary life 
imprisonment.
162
 He alleged that, because of the blanket ban on prisoner voting in the United 
Kingdom, his right to vote was violated by section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 
1983.
163
  
 
Lord Justice Kennedy, who wrote the judgment, had to determine whether section 3(1) of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 was compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Hirst 
asserted that he was entitled to a declaration of incompatibility in terms of section 4(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.
164
 Kennedy J noted that the wording of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
does not confer rights on individuals; however it has been interpreted to confer such rights in 
the past.
165
 This is apparent from the case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium in which 
the European Court of Human Rights interpreted Article 3 to include the right to vote and the 
right to stand for election.
166
 Kennedy J quoted a piece from the Mathieu-Mohin judgement 
which contains the requirements which have to be met in order for section 3(1) of the 1983 
Act to be in line with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1: 
 
―The rights in question are not absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them 
forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied limitations. In their 
internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election 
subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. They have a wide 
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margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort 
whether the requirements of Protocol No 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that 
the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very 
essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such 
conditions must not thwart `the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature.‖167 
 
The Secretary of State for the Home Department argued that convicted prisoners who are in 
custody ―have forfeited their right to have a say in the way the country is governed‖, because 
they have lost the moral authority to vote.
168
 He gave his reasons for maintaining the current 
policy for the disenfranchisement of prisoners. He stated the following: 
 
―By committing offences which by themselves or taken with any aggravating circumstances 
including the offender's character and previous criminal record require a custodial sentence, 
such prisoners have forfeited the right to have a say in the way the country is governed for that 
period. There is more than one element to punishment than forcible detention. Removal from 
society means removal from the privileges of society, amongst which is the right to vote for 
one's representative.‖169 
 
The government did not give a proper account of the aims it tried to achieve through this 
blanket exclusion of convicted prisoners; however it is apparent that the purpose of the 
disenfranchisement was to punish the offender.  
 
Kennedy J held that out of respect to the legislature, courts should not easily be persuaded to 
condemn what the legislature has done, especially where it has been done in primary 
legislation after careful evaluation and against a background of increasing public concern 
about crime.
170
 He dismissed the application and chose to ―defer to the legislator‖.171 He thus 
chose to comply with the decision of the Legislator to limit the right of convicted prisoners to 
vote. In addition to this conclusion Kennedy J referred to the Canadian case Sauvé v Canada 
(No 2) in which Linden JA wrote the following: 
 
―I would leave to philosophers the determination of the `true nature' of the disenfranchisement. 
It may be argued that this legislation does different things - it imposes a civil consequence, it 
fixes a civil disability, it imposes a criminal penalty, it furthers a civic goal, it promotes an 
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electoral goal, or it is part of the sentencing process. I believe that these arguments, made alone, 
are of limited assistance.‖172 
 
Kennedy J agreed with Linden JA and stated that perhaps it would be the best course to let 
the philosophers determine the true nature of disenfranchisement.
173
 Kennedy J thus 
respected the legislature‘s authority by accepting the exclusion of convicted prisoners, 
however he was of the opinion that philosophers are in a better position to determine the 
nature of disenfranchisement. 
 
As a result of the case being dismissed in the High Court, Mr Hirst made an application to 
appeal this decision; however this application was dismissed by Lord Justice Simon Brown 
on the ground that the appeal had no real prospect of success.
174
 After the application for 
appeal was dismissed, Mr Hirst instituted proceedings in the European Court of Human 
Rights and for this reason; the position of prisoner voting rights under the European 
Convention will follow. 
 
3.3 Active voting rights of prisoners under the European Convention  
 
As pointed out already the relevant provision in the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (―the European Convention on Human Rights‖) is Article 
3 of Protocol No. 1 which is the provision dealing with voting rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights ―rules on individual or State applications alleging violations of the civil and 
political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights.‖175 The European Court 
has made the status of prisoner voting rights quite clear, however some States, as will be seen 
below, has not yet conformed to the European Court‘s position on prisoner 
disenfranchisement.  Such States rely on the ‗margin of appreciation‘ which is afforded to 
them. 
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3.3.1 Hirst v the United Kingdom (2005) 
 
3.3.1.1 Chamber Judgment 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Grand Chamber, first outlined the Chamber 
Judgment. The court first pointed out that in dealing with this case it had to keep in mind that 
Mr Hirst‘s tariff (the part of his sentence relating to retribution and deterrence) expired in 
June 1994. The tariff refers to the minimum period a prisoner who is serving a life sentence 
must serve to meet the requirements of retribution and deterrence before being considered for 
release.
176
 After prisoner has served this minimum sentence he or she will only be released if 
the prisoner is judged to no longer be a risk of harming the public.
177
 
 
Mr Hirst submitted that the UK‘s blanket disenfranchisement of convicted persons was not a 
result of a reasoned and properly justified decision that was reached after a thorough debate, 
but it was out of adherence to historical tradition.
178
 According to him there was no evidence 
that the ban pursued the aims that the government was trying to achieve and no link had been 
shown between the removal of the right to vote and the prevention of crime or respect for the 
rule of law.
179
 According to him the limitation was unrelated to the nature or seriousness of 
the offence and varied in its effects on prisoners depending on whether their imprisonment 
coincided with an election.
180
 
 
The government submitted that the right to vote, under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, was not 
absolute, because a wide margin of appreciation was to be allowed to contracting states to 
determine under which conditions the right to vote is to be exercised.
181
 The government was 
of the view that the court failed to give due weight to this consideration.
182
 The government 
noted that even if it restricted the ban to those who committed the most serious offences the 
applicant would still be prevented from voting, because he was serving a sentence of life 
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imprisonment for the offence of homicide.
183
 The government submitted that the reason for 
the ban was because convicted prisoners had breached the social contract and thus forfeited 
the right to take part in the government of the country.
184
 It submitted that the measures used 
were proportionate, because it only affected those who committed the serious offences which 
warranted an immediate custodial sentence and it excluded those subject to fines, suspended 
sentences, community service or detention for contempt of court as well as fine defaulters 
and remand prisoners.
185
  
 
The Court emphasised that ―the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are 
crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful 
democracy governed by the rule of law.‖186 Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 requires that a 
limitation only be imposed as a result of a legitimate aim and the means employed to achieve 
such aim must not be disproportionate.
187
 The Court found that the exclusion from voting of 
convicted prisoners in detention was disproportionate. The reason for this was because the 
limitation applied to a large amount of people automatically without considering the length of 
the sentence or the gravity of the offence.
188
 The court also held that insofar as the 
disqualification was seen to be part of punishment there was no logical justification for the 
disqualification to continue, because Mr Hirst completed the part of his sentence that related 
to punishment and deterrence.
189
 It further held that there is no place under the Convention 
system for an automatic disenfranchisement which is based purely on what might offend 
public opinion.
190
 The Court concluded that Article 3 Protocol No. 1 had been breached. As a 
result of this judgment the UK government decided to seek a hearing at the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights.
191
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3.3.1.2 Grand Chamber Judgment 
 
In the Grand Chamber the court had to determine whether the blanket ban pursued a 
legitimate aim in a proportionate manner. With regards to the aim of the blanket ban the court 
submitted that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention does not specifically state or 
limit the aims which a measure must pursue in order to be compatible with it.
192
 The 
government argued that the aim of the limitation on prisoners‘ voting rights were to prevent 
crime and to enhance civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law.
193
 The other aim was 
to confer an additional punishment on convicted prisoners. The court accepted that section 3 
of the Representation of the People‘s Act may be regarded as pursuing these aims and stated 
that there were no reasons to exclude the aims as flawed or per se incompatible with Article 3 
of Protocol No. 1.
194
 
 
With regards to the proportionality the court referred to the submissions of the government. 
The government argued that the ban was proportionate and submitted that it was restricted to 
prisoners convicted of crimes serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence.
195
 The Court 
held that even though there are categories of detained persons unaffected by the bar, it 
includes a wide range of offenders and sentences (from one day to life and from minor 
offences to the most serious offences).
196
 The court also observed that even if a person 
commits a serious offence, the question of whether the person will be deprived of his or her 
right to vote will depend on whether the judge will impose a custodial sentence or a 
community sentence.
197
 
 
The Court noted that it is evident that the nature of restrictions imposed on the rights of 
convicted prisoners to vote was in general seen as a matter which Parliament had to decide 
and not national courts.
198
 Although the situation was improved by the Act of 2000, which 
granted the right to vote to persons detained on remand, section 3 of the 1983 Act remains a 
―blunt instrument‖, because it still strips a significant amount of people of their Convention 
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right to vote.
199
 It strips convicted prisoners of their right to vote irrespective of the length of 
their sentence and irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence and their individual 
circumstances.
200
 The Court found that this restriction is general, automatic and 
indiscriminate and it must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation 
and as being incompatible with Article 3 Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.
201
 
 
The government submitted that it was concerned that the Court, in its Chamber judgement, 
had failed to give any explanation as to what steps the United Kingdom would have to take to 
render its policy compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and urged in the interests of 
legal certainty that Contracting States received detailed guidance from the court.
202
 The Court 
said that its function is to rule on the compatibility of legislation with the Convention and it is 
for the state concerned to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to 
discharge of its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention.
203
 It is left to the legislature to 
decide on the choice of the means for securing the rights guaranteed by Article 3 Protocol 
No. 1.
204
 The Court concluded by stating that there has been a violation of Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1.
205
 
 
Judge Caflisch wrote a concurring opinion to that of the majority opinion above. Caflisch 
held that even though some democratic states have a presumption of universal suffrage, it 
does not mean that the state is unable to restrict the right to vote, elect and stand for 
election.
206
 There must, however, be limits on such restrictions.
207
 In response to the 
argument by the government, that the disenfranchisement was in line with the objectives of 
preventing crime and punishing offenders and thus enhancing civic responsibility, he said 
that he disagrees with this and believes that participating in the democratic process may serve 
as a first step towards re-socialisation.
208
 He went on to state that ―[i]t might have been useful 
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if the Court […] had indicated some of the parameters to be respected by democratic States 
when limiting the right to participate in votes or elections.‖209  
 
He made some suggestions as to what, in his opinion, should have been some of the elements 
contained in these parameters. First, he suggested that the measures of disenfranchisement 
must be prescribed by law, secondly, the law authorising the disenfranchisement cannot be a 
blanket law, meaning the disenfranchisement must be restricted to major crimes.
210
 He also 
made a third suggestion which is followed by a fourth one. He suggests that the legislation 
authorising the disenfranchisement as additional punishment should be a matter to be decided 
by the judge and not the executive.
211
 He finally suggests that ― in those Contracting States 
where the sentence may comprise a punitive part (retribution and deterrence) and a period of 
detention based on the risk inherent in the prisoner‘s release [the period after the tariff], the 
disenfranchisement must remain confined to the punitive part and not be extended to the 
remainder of the sentence.‖212 
 
Judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky also wrote a joint concurring opinion. They stated that 
convicted prisoners were banned from voting, irrespective of the gravity or nature of the 
offence and this shows that the reason for the disqualification is the fact that they are serving 
a prison sentence.
213
 There are no practical reasons for denying prisoners the right to vote. 
There is no room in the convention for the old notion of ‗civil death‘ that lies behind the ban 
on convicted prisoners‘ voting.214 A convicted person‘s imprisonment is the ground for 
disenfranchisement, however the lack of a rational basis for this is a good enough reason for 
finding that there is a violation of the Convention.
215
  
 
The court was divided 12 to 5. Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens, who 
disagreed with the majority of the Court, wrote the minority judgement. In their joint 
dissenting opinion judges Wildhaber, Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens held that they do 
not agree with the majority and are of the opinion that there was not a violation of Article 3 
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Protocol No.1.
216
 They looked at the wording of  Article 3 of Protocol No.1 and came to the 
conclusion that it does not directly grant individual rights and contains no conditions for the 
elections other than the requirement that the ‗free expression of the opinion of the people‘ 
must be ensured.
217
 ―This indicates that the guarantee of a proper functioning of the 
democratic process was considered to be of primary importance.‖218 The Article does not 
prescribe any aims which might justify restrictions of the protected rights.
219
 They accepted 
that the restriction on the voting rights of prisoners was legitimate for purposes of preventing 
crime, punishing offenders and enhancing civic responsibility, and respect for the rule of 
law.
220
 
 
It is an important task for the Court to ensure that the rights granted by the Convention 
system comply with ‗present-day conditions‘ however it is important to bear in mind that the 
Court is not the legislator and should be careful not to assume legislative functions.
221
 The 
judges pointed out that that some European countries also have restrictions on prisoners‘ right 
to vote and that the legislation in Europe shows that there is little consensus about whether or 
not prisoners should have the right to vote.
222
 They stated that it is a fact that the majority of 
the member states knows about the restrictions imposed although some have blanket and 
some limited restrictions and because of this the legislation in the United Kingdom cannot be 
said to be in disharmony with a common European standard.
223
  
 
What follows are some of the prisoner voting rights judgments, post- Hirst, as handed down 
by the UK Supreme Court and the European Court. These cases will be discussed in order to 
illustrate which government aims the European Court accepts as legitimate and to determine 
which factors the Court takes into account when doing the proportionality analysis. With 
regards to the cases which follow, all the applicants in the cases alleged that their country‘s 
electoral legislation prevented them from voting as a result of their imprisonment and thus 
violated their right to vote as contained in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 
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3.3.2 Post-Hirst case law 
 
3.3.2.1 Frodl v Austria (2010)  
 
The applicant, Mr Frodl, was serving a life imprisonment of more than one year for murder 
and as a result was disenfranchised.
224
 As a result of his imprisonment his name was not 
entered in the electoral register.
225
 The relevant legislation which disenfranchised the 
applicant was Article 26(5) of the Federal Constitutional Act which states the following: 
 
―Forfeiture of the right to vote and to stand for election can only ensue from a court sentence.‖ 
 
Section 22 of the National Assembly Election Act, on the other hand, reads as follows: 
 
―(1) Anyone who has been convicted by a domestic court of one or more criminal offences 
committed with intent and sentenced with final effect to a term of imprisonment of more than 
one year shall forfeit the right to vote[…] (2) If the legal consequences [of a conviction] are 
suspended under other legal provisions or have lapsed or if all legal consequences or the 
forfeiture of the right to vote have been pardoned, the convicted person shall not forfeit the 
right to vote; nor shall he or she forfeit the right to vote if the court has imposed a conditional 
sentence. If the condition is revoked, disenfranchisement shall take effect from the day that 
decision becomes operative.‖ 
 
Frodl alleged that his exclusion under section 22 of the National Assembly Election Act was 
unlawful as this provision was unconstitutional and not compatible with Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1 of the Convention.
226
 The government submitted that the legal situation in Austria 
differed from that at issue in the Hirst case, because under Austrian law there was no 
indiscriminate disenfranchisement of all detainees.
227
 In Austria, in order for a limitation on 
the voting rights of prisoners to take effect there has to be a final conviction for one or several 
intentionally committed criminal acts carrying a prison sentence of more than one year.
228
  
The government also argued that section 44(2) of the Criminal Code gave the judge an 
opportunity to conditionally suspend the legal consequences of the conviction 
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(disenfranchisement).
229
 In this way the individual circumstances of the affected person is 
taken into account.
230
 
 
Frodl submitted that the government did not explicitly list specific aims pursued by the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners in Austrian law and therefore the disenfranchisement must 
be regarded as not being in accordance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
231
 In determining 
whether the measure of disenfranchisement pursued a legitimate aim in a proportionate 
manner the Court noted that this case has certain similarities to that of Hirst.
232
 The Court 
responded to Frodl‘s submission regarding the aim of the disenfranchisement by stating that 
―[i]t is true that the Government did not structure their submissions by explicitly setting out 
first the legitimate aims pursued by the measure at issue and then demonstrating the 
proportionality of the manner in which those aims were pursued. However, given the less 
formal structure of the necessity test under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court nevertheless 
considers that it transpires from the arguments relied on by the Government and the specific 
references to those relied on in the Hirst case, that they consider that the provisions on 
disenfranchisement of prisoners under Austrian law pursued the legitimate aims of preventing 
crime by punishing the conduct of convicted prisoners and also of enhancing civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law.‖233 The Court found no reason to regard these 
aims as ―untenable or incompatible‖ with Article 3 Protocol No.1.234 
 
With regards to the conditions for disenfranchisement set out in section 22 of the National 
Assembly Election Act, the Court found that this provision is more detailed than the one in 
Hirst and there is no automatic disenfranchisement of all prisoners because it applies only in 
the case of a prison sentence exceeding one year and only to convictions for offences 
committed with intent.
235
 The Court agreed with the applicant that section 22 of the National 
Assembly Election Act does not meet all the criteria established in Hirst. Under the Hirst test 
it is also an essential element that the decision on disenfranchisement should be taken by a 
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judge who will take into account the particular circumstances but besides this, there must be a 
link between the offence committed and issues relating to elections and democratic 
institutions.
236
 The Court thus found that the government had an aim; however there was no 
link between the sanction of life imprisonment and the conduct (murder) and circumstances 
of the individual concerned which led to the applicant's disenfranchisement.
237
 For this reason 
the Court found that there has been a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in the present 
case.
238
 
 
3.3.2.2 Greens and M.T. v United Kingdom (2010) 
 
This case is similar to that of Hirst, it concerned an application against the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by two British nationals.
239
 They were both serving a 
determinate sentence of imprisonment.
240
 They alleged that Article 3 of Protocol No.1 of the 
European Convention was violated as a result of the refusal to enrol them on the electoral 
register for domestic elections and for elections to the European Parliament.
241
 This 
prohibition is contained in sections 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
 
The applicants complained about the fact that they had been subject to a blanket ban on 
voting in elections and, as a result, were unable to vote in the European Parliamentary 
Elections which were held in June 2009 and in the General Elections in May 2010.
242
 The 
court criticised the UK government‘s delay in in implementing this Court's judgment in Hirst 
and in amending section 3 of the Act.
243
 The Court revisited the case of Hirst and concluded 
that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
244
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3.3.2.3 Scoppola v Italy (No.3) (2012) 
 
This case concerns the exclusion of the applicant, an Italian national from voting. He was 
found guilty of the murder of his wife and attempted murder of his son and was sentenced to 
thirty years‘ imprisonment and a lifetime ban from public office within the meaning of 
Article 29 of the Criminal Code.
245
 His name was deleted from the electoral roll which meant 
that he could not vote.
246
  
 
In terms of the Italian legal system a ban from public office is an ancillary penalty which 
entails the forfeiture of the right to vote.
247
 The Italian Criminal Code makes express 
provision for the forfeiture of the right to vote if such forfeiture is as a result of any of a series 
of specific offences, irrespective of the duration of the sentence imposed.
248
 Besides the 
specific offences which results in the forfeiture of voting rights, a conviction for any offence 
punishable by imprisonment will also result in the offender being banned from public office. 
Such a ban can be temporary (where the sentence is three years or more) or it can be 
permanent (for sentences of five years or more and life imprisonment).
249
 
 
The Criminal Code, Article 28, provides the following with regards to the ban from public 
office: 
 
―The ban from public office may be for life or temporary. In the event of a lifetime ban from 
public office, unless the law provides otherwise, the convicted person shall be deprived of: 
(1) the right to vote or stand for election in any electoral body (comizio elettorale) and all other 
political rights.‖ 
 
The Criminal Code, Article 29, provides the following, with regards to the sentences which 
entail a ban from public office: 
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―A sentence to life imprisonment or to imprisonment for no less than five years shall entail a 
lifetime ban from public office for the convicted person; sentencing to imprisonment for not 
less than three years shall entail a five-year ban from public office ...‖ 
 
It would at this point be important to note that ―in Italian law, under Article 29 of the 
Criminal Code, only those offenders sentenced to at least three years‘ imprisonment were 
deprived of the right to vote. Where the offence attracted a sentence of less than five years, 
the disenfranchisement lasted only five years, a lifelong ban on voting being reserved for 
offenders sentenced to between five years and life.‖250 
 
The Italian Government made similar submissions to those made by the United Kingdom 
Government in the Hirst case. It pointed out that, where the right to vote is concerned, 
Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation and that the denial of the applicant‘s 
right to vote pursued the legitimate aims of preventing crime and upholding the rule of law.
251
 
It also argued that it met the proportionality requirement.
252
 In addition the Government 
pointed out that in Italian law, unlike the UK law; the loss of the right to vote did not depend 
on the detention of an individual, but on judgments in criminal cases becoming final.
253
 The 
disenfranchisement of Mr Scoppola was based on a penalty as prescribed by law and such 
disenfranchisement is not a measure that is applied automatically.
254
 The Government 
concluded its submissions by stating that ―the Italian legal system was designed, according to 
the Government, to avoid the discrimination that could arise if courts were free to make 
decisions on a case-by-case basis in such a sensitive area as that of political rights.‖255 
 
The Court submitted that it must determine ―whether there was interference with the 
applicant‘s rights under that provision. The Court noted that it must determine whether the 
measures used by the government to disenfranchise prisoners exceeded any acceptable 
margin of appreciation.
256
 It held that there was an interference with the applicant‘s right to 
vote (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1), because of the ancillary penalty imposed on him.
257
 It 
stated that ―the applicant‘s disenfranchisement pursued the legitimate aims of enhancing civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law and ensuring the proper functioning and 
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preservation of the democratic regime.‖258 The Court found that it cannot conclude that the 
Italian system has the general, automatic and indiscriminate character that led it, in the Hirst 
case, to find a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
259
 It held that in Italy, 
disenfranchisement in only in relation to serious offences and not minor ones or those which, 
although more serious in principle, do not attract sentences of three years‘ imprisonment or 
more.
260
 The court thus concluded with the following remarks: 
 
―[T]he restrictions imposed on the applicant‘s right to vote did not ―thwart the free expression 
of the people in the choice of the legislature‖, and maintained ―the integrity and effectiveness of 
an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage‖. 
The margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent Government in this sphere has therefore 
not been overstepped. Accordingly [the court held, by sixteen votes to one that], there has been 
no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.‖261 
 
In Italian law the impugned measure was applied only where the offence was punishable with 
a particularly heavy sentence, including life imprisonment which meant that the measure was 
proportional.
262
 
 
According to Javier Jaramillo the Scoppola judgment is regarded by some as a setback for 
prisoner rights, because the continued disenfranchisement permits the continued 
stigmatisation of prisoners.
263
 It seems that Jaramillo and others who see the Scoppola 
judgment as a setback for prisoner rights have a misunderstanding of the judgment. I can 
draw no other conclusion, because why else would they consider Scoppola as a setback, if 
anything the judgment improves the position of prisoners in the electoral process. Jaramillo is 
also of the view that the Court missed an opportunity in Scoppola to provide clarity and 
direction on the question of prisoner disenfranchisement.
264
 Again this has no merit, because 
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the Scoppola judgement is an example of the type of disenfranchisement which the Court will 
permit as opposed to a blanket ban, as in Hirst. Some observers viewed the Scoppola decision 
as proof that the United Kingdom‘s refusal to comply with Hirst had worked.265 According to 
Jaramillo, the Scoppola case might have been a response by the European Court to the 
pressure from the United Kingdom.
266
 This view, again, has no merit because the two cases, 
Hirst and Scoppola, are based on completely different facts and disenfranchising legislation. 
According to Jaramillo the European Court missed an opportunity in Scoppola to provide 
clarity and direction on the question of prisoner disenfranchisement; because after the 
Scoppola judgement it remains unclear as to what other forms of prisoner disenfranchisement 
are impermissible.
267
  
 
3.3.2.4 Soyler v Turkey (2013) 
 
The applicant was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of four years, eleven months and 
twenty-six days for having drawn a number of cheques without having sufficient funds in his 
bank account.
268
 As a result of this conviction he was excluded from voting while serving his 
prison sentence. He alleged that his inability to vote was in violation of Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention.
269
 
 
Section 7(3) of the Law on Basic Provisions Concerning Elections and on Registers of Voters 
(Law No. 298 of 1961) provides that convicts in penitentiary establishments cannot vote. 
Section 53(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237 of 2004) on the other hand provides 
that as the statutory consequence of imposition of a prison sentence for an offence committed 
intentionally, a person shall be deprived of the right to vote, the right to stand for election and 
the enjoyment of all other political rights. This excludes a convicted person whose prison 
sentence is suspended or who is conditionally released from the prison.
270
 
 
The rationale behind section 53 is that society has lost trust in the offender and therefore the 
offender (convicted person) is prevented from exercising certain rights which necessitate a 
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relationship of trust.
271
 The rationale behind this punishment is to ensure that the criminal 
regrets having committed the offence and in the process is rehabilitated.
272
 This was the aim 
which the government relied on. 
 
The applicant submitted that the offence did not mean that he was so morally or mentally 
untrustworthy as to be prevented from exercising his civic duties.
273
 He also submitted that 
the disenfranchising legislation did not take into account the nature of the offence or the 
severity of the punishment and for this reason the application of the legislation was wholly 
disproportionate.
274
 ―The only criterion taken into account when imposing the ban was the 
element of ―intention" in the commission of the offence.‖275 
 
The Court held that persons convicted of having intentionally committed an offence are 
unable to vote and their disenfranchisement does not come to an end on release from prison 
on probation, but continues until the end of their original sentence period.
276
 The Court held 
that the government‘s aim in encouraging citizen-like conduct is not per se incompatible with 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
277
 The Court held that ―the restrictions placed on convicted 
prisoners‘ voting rights in Turkey are harsher and more far-reaching than those applicable in 
the United Kingdom, Austria and Italy, which have been the subject matter of examination by 
the Court in its judgments.‖278  
  
With regards to the proportionality analysis the Court held that the intervention of a judge is 
in principle likely to guarantee the proportionality of restrictions on prisoners‘ voting rights, 
however ―in Turkey, disenfranchisement is an automatic consequence derived from the 
statute, and is therefore not left to the discretion or supervision of the judge.‖279 It also held 
that the measure restricting the right to vote is indiscriminate in its application because it 
―does not take into account the nature or gravity of the offence, the length of the prison 
sentence – leaving aside the suspended sentences shorter than one year – or the individual 
circumstances of the convicted persons. The Turkish legislation contains no express 
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provisions categorising or specifying any offences for which disenfranchisement is 
foreseen.‖280 
 
The Court concluded by stating that it is unable to see any rational connection between the 
sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the applicant.
281
 It further concluded that ―the 
automatic and indiscriminate application of the harsh measure in Turkey on a vitally 
important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of 
appreciation, and that there has been a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in the present 
case.‖282 
 
3.3.2.5 R (on the application of Chester v Secretary of State for Justice) and McGeoch v 
The Lord President of the Council (2013) 
 
Unlike the cases above, which were heard in the European Court, this was a case heard by the 
UK Supreme Court. This case is similar to that of Hirst to the extent that it is based on the 
same disenfranchising law. The case concerned appeals of two prisoners convicted of murder 
and sentenced to life imprisonment and who, as a result, was excluded from voting.
283
  
 
The Attorney General submitted that the Supreme Court should refuse to follow the European 
Court‘s authority as per Hirst and Scoppola.284 He based this argument on the wide margin of 
appreciation which states have in this area and on section 4 of the Human Rights Act which 
authorises a domestic court to make a declaration of invalidity where legislation is 
incompatible with a Convention Right.
285
 His argument is thus that the UK courts may 
deviate from the European Court‘s judgments; because the Human rights Act contemplates 
that domestic legislation may not be compatible with the country‘s international obligations 
as established by case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.
286
 According to the 
Attorney General the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged the margin of 
appreciation which States have, but failed to respect it.
287
 The Attorney General pointed out 
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that the European Court has accepted as a legitimate aim of disenfranchisement ―enhancing 
civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law‖ and his argument is thus that because of 
this the UK is entitled to withhold the vote from those serving sentences for offences 
sufficiently serious to justify such a sentence.
288
 
 
The Court held that it would not to be right for it to refuse to apply the principles established 
by the Grand Chamber decisions in Hirst and Scoppola consistently with the way in which 
they were understood and applied in those decisions.
289
 The Court expressed that it cannot 
disregard (―dis-apply‖) the legislative prohibition on prisoner voting by making all prisoners 
eligible to vote.
290
 It is clear from Hirst and Scoppola that a ban on eligibility will be justified 
in respect of a very significant number of convicted prisoners.
291
  
 
3.3.2.6 Firth and others v United Kingdom (2014) 
 
Ten British nationals lodged an application against the UK and Northern Ireland. They were 
all incarcerated, however their case-file does not disclose either the offences of which they 
were convicted or the lengths of the sentences of imprisonment imposed on them.
292
 They 
were automatically prevented from voting. The Court held that ―[g]iven that the impugned 
legislation remains un-amended, the Court cannot but conclude that, as in Hirst (no. 2) and 
Greens and M.T. and for the same reasons, there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1 in the applicants‘ case.‖293 
 
3.3.2.7 Murat Vural v Turkey (2014) 
 
The applicant poured paint on various statutes, at various locations, of Atatürk, the founder 
and the first President of the Republic of Turkey.
294
 This meant that he had committed the 
offence on five separate occasions. He was charged with and found guilty of the offence of 
contravening the Law on Offences Committed Against Atatürk (Law no. 5816) and as a 
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result was sentenced to three years‘ imprisonment.295 The trial court increased the sentence 
by half, because of the fact that that the offence was committed in a public place. He was thus 
sentenced to a prison term of twenty-two years and six months.
296
 
 
The Law on Offences Committed Against Atatürk (Law no. 5816) provides as follows: 
 
―Section 1: […]Anyone who demolishes, breaks, ruins or dirties a sculpture, statue, monument 
or the mausoleum of Atatürk, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of between one and 
five years…‖ 
 
Section 53 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237 of 2004) is also applicable here, as in the 
Soyler case. The relevant provision is section 53(1)(b) which provides that a person who gets 
a prison sentence as a result of having intentionally committed an offence shall be deprived 
of the right to vote, the right to stand for election and the enjoyment of all other political 
rights.  
 
The Court held that it ―has already found it established that in Turkey disenfranchisement is 
an automatic consequence derived from the statute and that it is indiscriminate in its 
application in that it does not take into account the nature or gravity of the offence, the length 
of the prison sentence – leaving aside suspended sentences shorter than one year – or the 
individual circumstances of those convicted.‖297 The Court concluded by stating that there is 
nothing in the case which allows it to reach a different conclusion than that in Soyler and 
therefore held that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention 
on account of the applicant‘s disenfranchisement.298 
 
Based on the Court‘s judgement in Hirst and the judgments which followed, the UK 
government had four occasions at which proposals and recommendations for the reform of 
section 3 of the Representation of the People‘s Act were made. One of these 
recommendations took the form of the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill. The relevant 
consultation processes at which proposals for reform were made are outlined in the following 
part section of this chapter. 
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3.4 Recommendations for legislative reform in UK 
 
The United Kingdom Government responded in 2006 to the European Court‘s judgement, as 
laid down in the Hirst case in 2005, through drafting consultation papers. Several proposals 
were made as to possible ways in which the government can address the issue of the blanket 
ban of prisoners from voting. The first proposal was to retain the current ban on voting rights 
of convicted prisoners. This proposal would be in line with the view of many people, that 
prisoners should remain disenfranchised.
299
 The second proposal was to enfranchise 
prisoners sentenced to less than a specified term. This proposal focusses on the duration of 
the prison term. It is the policy of many of the member states within the European Council to 
disenfranchise those prisoners with a long prison sentence and to enfranchise those with a 
shorter term.
300
  
 
The third proposal was to allow the sentencing judge to decide on whether or not to withdraw 
the franchise. The government pointed out that there are two alternatives linked to the third 
proposal.
301
 The first is to have legislation which empowers courts to enfranchise a convicted 
person, despite a general statutory disenfranchisement and the second is to have legislation 
which empowers courts to disenfranchise a convicted person despite a general statutory 
provision which extends the franchise to prisoners.
302
 The government has its reservations 
about this proposal to the extent that it questions whether judges are best placed to exercise 
control over a person‘s right to vote.303 
 
The fourth proposal was to disenfranchise all tariff-expired life sentence prisoners. These are 
prisoners who are kept in prison beyond the original length of their sentence, for whatever 
reason. The government considers that to enfranchise such prisoners would not be desirable, 
because these prisoners were detained further beyond their original term, reason being that 
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they still pose a danger to society.
304
 The government also made certain proposals relating to 
prisoners who were found guilty of electoral offences. The government states that such 
persons automatically lose their right to vote.
305
 
 
The second stage of the consultation process took place in 2009. The government believed 
that tying the vote to the length of the sentence would establish a clear relationship to the 
seriousness of the offence and the suspension of the vote.
306
 It thus found that it would be 
appropriate to undertake a limited enfranchisement with eligibility determined on the basis of 
the length of a sentence, which was the second proposal of the first consultation.
307
 The first 
proposal, the one which the government favours, is that prisoners sentenced to less than one 
year’s imprisonment would be automatically entitled to vote, this is subject to certain 
exceptions linked to the type of offence.
308
 The second and third proposals apply the same 
rules as the first, however they relate to a two year and four year length of imprisonment. The 
fourth proposal relates to the provision that a person who received a sentence of between two 
and four years could apply to a judge to vote.
309
 The government expressed its stance that it 
will not enfranchise those prisoners serving a life or other indeterminate sentence and this 
will include cases where they are post-tariff prisoners.
310
 
 
Even though the two stage consultation process took place to change the policy regarding 
prisoner voting, no change in the law took place before the general election on 6 May 
2010.
311
 The government announced on 20 December 2010 that it will enact legislation to 
allow those offenders sentenced to a custodial sentence of less than four years the right to 
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vote in UK Parliamentary and European Parliament elections, however it stated that this will 
only occur if a sentencing judge considers the enfranchisement appropriate.
312
 
 
Steve Foster and Nicholas Munn made certain recommendations in their work. Steve Foster 
is of the opinion that citizenship and democratic rights should only be limited for reasons 
such as to prevent disorder or crime or to protect the rights of others.
313
 He recommends that 
if the government‘s aim is to punish offenders through disenfranchisement then such aim 
should be clearly articulated in sentencing law and policy which distinguish certain offences 
and offenders.
314
 Nicholas Munn, on the other hand, is of the opinion that in order for a 
system of criminal disenfranchisement to be legitimate it must; apply only to those offenders 
who committed the most serious offence.
315
 Criminal disenfranchisement is a serious 
punishment and to apply indiscriminately to all imprisoned leads to the proportionality of its 
application being lost.
316
 In order to avoid this Munn proposes that it is important to establish, 
what he calls a ‗trigger point‘ for disenfranchisement, ―i.e. a degree of seriousness beyond 
which disenfranchisement is an appropriate component of punishment.‖317 This means that 
each state should have a ‗trigger point‘ (a factor which determines which prisoners can and 
cannot vote). 
 
The UK government compiled a draft Bill called the Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill 2012. 
This Bill was drafted in response to Greens and M.T. and Scoppola and contains three 
options for reform of prisoners‘ disenfranchisement. The three options, as found in the Bill, 
are to ban prisoners sentenced to 4 or more years imprisonment
318
, to ban prisoners sentenced 
to more than 6 month‘s imprisonment319 or to ban all prisoners.320  
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In 2013 the Joint Committee Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill 
released a report in which it assessed the position on prisoner voting rights under the 
Convention and the judgments as handed down by the European Court. The Committee 
recommended that the UK Parliament should comply with the Court‘s judgment in Hirst by 
enacting legislation that would confer voting rights on some convicted prisoners.
321
 The 
committee recommended that those sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or less 
should retain the right to vote. The reason for this term is because 12 months is the maximum 
period of imprisonment that a magistrates‘ court can impose for multiple offences and 
because it corresponds with the position that pertained at the time the UK ratified the 
Convention and the First Protocol.
322
 The committee also recommended that prisoners should 
be enfranchised in the period leading up to release thus they should be entitled to apply, six 
months before their scheduled release date, to be registered to vote in the constituency into 
which they are due to be released.
323
 In addition it proposed a statutory framework which it 
believes to be proportionate: 
 
―We recommend that the Government bring forward a Bill, at the start of the 2014 –15 session 
of Parliament, to give legislative effect to the following conclusions: 1) That all prisoners 
serving sentences of 12 months or less should be entitled to vote in all UK parliamentary, local 
and European elections; 2) That such prisoners should be registered to vote in the constituency 
where they were registered prior to sentencing; and that, where there is no identified prior 
residence, they should be able to register by means of a declaration of local connection; 3) That 
prisoners should be entitled to apply, 6 months before their scheduled release date, to be 
registered to vote in the constituency into which they are due to be released.‖324 
 
Even though the UK government considered all these proposals and recommendations on 
four occasions the matter is still undecided as the government has failed to commit itself to 
any of them up until November 2014. Hopefully by 2015 the UK Parliament would have 
enacted the Committee‘s recommendations.  
 
This concludes the discussion on active voting rights, which will be followed by a discussion 
of the position in the United Kingdom in respect of passive voting rights. 
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3.5 The passive voting rights of prisoners in the United Kingdom (1998-2014) 
 
Unlike the active voting rights in the United Kingdom, England, its disputes relating to 
passive voting rights are non-existent, in as far as people with a criminal record is concerned. 
Out of the four United Kingdom countries, the focus will be on England. It has been 
mentioned that Article 3 of Protocol No.1 includes the right to stand for election and to sit as 
a member of Parliament, once elected. Even though people can stand for public office, 
democratic countries disqualify certain citizens, more importantly prisoners, from standing 
for election. 
 
Member states of the Council of Europe enjoy the liberty of establishing the criteria of 
eligibility to stand for election; this criterion varies from state to state and does so in 
accordance with the historical and political factors of each state.
325
 O‘Boyle says that because 
of this liberty which the member states have, when applying Article 3 ―any electoral 
legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country 
concerned.‖326 Like any election in any country, in order for an individual to stand for 
election he or she has to be eligible to stand for election and to hold public office. The United 
Kingdom has various elections. There are United Kingdom Parliamentary Elections, 
European Parliament Elections (because the UK is a member state of the European Union) 
and the England Local Government Election. 
 
In the Local Government Elections of England residents vote for councillors to represent a 
particular ward on the local council.
327
 In the General United Kingdom Parliamentary 
Elections, citizens vote for a Member of Parliament to sit in the UK Parliament in 
Westminster.
328
 In order to stand for election to the UK Parliament one must meet some 
qualifications. The candidate must be at least 18 years old and be either a British citizen, a 
citizen of the Republic of Ireland, or a citizen of a Commonwealth country who does not 
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require leave to enter or remain in the UK, or who has indefinite leave to remain in the UK.
329
 
A person standing for election is not required to be a registered elector (voter).  
 
In the United Kingdom a number of people are disqualified from becoming a Member of 
Parliament, in particular, convicted prisoners who are serving a prison sentence of more than 
a year. The Representation of the People Act 1981, section 1, provides that a person is 
disqualified from membership of the House of Commons if they meet all of the following 
criteria: 
 
―They have been found guilty of one or more offences, they have been sentenced to be 
imprisoned or detained for more than one year, they are detained in the UK, the Republic of 
Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, or are unlawfully at large at a time when they 
would otherwise be detained.‖330 
 
The European Parliament elections are held in each of the four UK states, one of which is 
England. Here citizens vote for members of the European Parliament to represent their 
region.
331
 Each of the four regions are allocated a number of members to stand for election, 
this number is determined by the number of people in the country.
332
 This summation of 
passive voting rights in the UK is just to illustrate that convicted prisoners are not eligible to 
stand for public office just like they are not eligible to vote. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
As can be deduced from the above case law, the different States administer criminal 
disenfranchisement differently. The disenfranchisement in these cases is based on factors 
such as: the type of offence, the nature of the offence (whether it was committed with intent 
or negligence), the length of the prison sentence, the circumstances of the offender, and the 
discretion of the sentencing judge. The aim which the States are trying to achieve through the 
disenfranchisement is the same in each of the cases being; enhancing civic responsibility and 
respect for the rule of law, ensuring the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic 
regime, crime prevention, and punishment. The European Court has accepted all these aims 
as legitimate, however the issue in each case was the proportionality analysis relating to the 
before mentioned factors. 
 
The Court‘s assessment of the different disenfranchising legislation has assisted in reaching a 
conclusion on the status of prisoners‘ voting rights in South Africa. For this reason a 
recommendation is made, for the reform of South African Electoral law, in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
COMPARATIVE CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This mini-thesis started out by looking at the nature and importance of the right to vote. The 
right to vote is a fundamental participatory element of our democracy. The right to vote has 
been described as a symbol of our citizenship and as ‗a badge of dignity and personhood‘.333 
Even so, the right to vote has always been subject to a series of voter exclusions and 
limitations. The limitation on which this mini-thesis focused is that of imprisonment. The 
main aim of this mini-thesis was to determine the constitutionality of prisoner 
disenfranchisement under Post-Apartheid law. In chapter two, with regards to active voting 
rights, the first preliminary conclusion reached was that the manner in which the Legislature 
has up to now tried to disenfranchise prisoners was unconstitutional. However, with regards 
to passive voting rights, it was found that the constitutional provision (section 47(1)(e)) 
which excludes prisoners from standing for public office, is an example of an active voting 
exclusion which might pass constitutional muster. This constitutional provision was 
measured against regional human rights law, in terms of the African Charter, to determine its 
compatibility with the right to vote. The second interim conclusion reached was that the 
compatibility of section 47(1)(e) with the African Charter was unclear. Because of this lack 
of clarity, the status of prisoners‘ voting rights in the UK was investigated in light of the 
European Court‘s judgments relating to prisoner disenfranchisement. This comparative 
investigation gave some clarity, in that it became apparent which types of exclusions are 
compatible with the European Convention and the human right to vote in general.  
 
Where does all of this leave the exclusion of convicted prisoners from exercising their right 
to vote in South Africa during, or immediately after, their imprisonment? This chapter draws 
on the preceding chapters to arrive at a comparative assessment of the status of prisoner 
disenfranchisement under South African and regional human rights law. The purpose of this 
chapter is to make certain recommendations to the South African legislature as to how it can 
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properly exclude certain categories of prisoners from voting. This chapter contains a 
proposed exclusion of prisoners which will pass constitutional muster. 
 
4.2 South African Constitutional Court vs European Court of Human Rights 
 
Both the SACC and the ECHR have set clear principles which must be followed when 
disenfranchising prisoners. The SACC has confirmed that prisoners may be disenfranchised 
and that Parliament is not prohibited from excluding prisoners from voting.
334
 However, what 
the Court made clear is that a blanket exclusion would not be constitutional. The Court 
rejected the exclusion of all prisoners serving a prison sentence without the option of a fine 
and found that this too was an exclusion which is not constitutional.
335
 This exclusion 
included a large amount of prisoners and the Court found that the exclusion was too broad in 
that the exclusion included all offences and both shorter and longer periods of 
imprisonment.
336
 In addition this exclusion affected both those prisoners who are serving a 
prison sentence while awaiting the outcome of an appeal and those whose appeals have been 
finalised.
337
  
 
The ECHR, like the SACC, held that even though some democratic states have a presumption 
of universal suffrage, it does not mean that the state is unable to restrict the right to vote, elect 
and stand for election.
338
 These restrictions must however be limited, which is why the ECHR 
has rejected the blanket exclusion of prisoners from voting and found that it is not compatible 
with the European Convention.
339
 The reason for this finding was the same as that of the 
SACC in that the exclusion includes a wide range of offenders and sentences (from one day 
to life and from minor offences to the most serious offences).
340
  
 
                                                          
334
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [31] and [32]. 
335
 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders 
(NICRO) and Others (CCT 03/04) [2004] ZACC; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) at [65] 
(hereafter Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004)); Electoral Act 34 of 2003, section 24B(2): ―A person who 
is in prison on election day may only vote if he or she is not serving a sentence of imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.‖ 
336
 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) at [67]. 
337
 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) at [152]. 
338
 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No.2) [2005] ECHR 681 at [2] (hereafter Hirst v the United Kingdom (2005)). 
339
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340
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The Court has accepted law, which disenfranchises those prisoners who committed an 
offence with intent and as a result are serving a sentence of more than one year, as not 
automatic and which might have been compatible with the Convention.
341
 However, the 
Court has confirmed that there must be a link between the offence committed and issues 
relating to elections and democratic institutions.
342
 Thus a law disenfranchising prisoners who 
committed an offence with intent and as a result are serving a sentence of more than one year 
would be compatible with the Convention if the offence for which such person is sentenced is 
linked to issues relating to elections and democratic institutions. Another exclusion which the 
Court has accepted as being compatible with the Convention is a disenfranchisement which is 
only in relation to serious offences and not minor ones or those which, although more serious 
in principle, do not attract sentences of three years‘ imprisonment or more, are compatible 
with the Convention.
343
 
 
The ECHR laid more emphasis on the fact that the exclusion must bear a connection with the 
type of offence committed and the length of the sentence in order for it to be in line with the 
Convention. The SACC did the same however such position was not emphasised and seemed 
to have been abandoned when Chaskalson J and Ncgobo J suggested the exclusion contained 
in section 47(1)(e) of the Constitution (which does not make reference to any type of offence 
only the length of the prison sentence) as an exclusion which will pass constitutional muster. 
 
It is a principle that if a right is limited, such limitation must be justified. In order to justify a 
limitation on a right the party limiting the right must put forward the objectives which such 
limitation serves to achieve. Even though the particular party can identify legitimate 
objectives, the mean used to achieve these objectives must not be disproportionate, meaning 
such objectives must pass a proportionality test.
344
 In the judgments of both Courts, certain 
objectives, which the respective governments were trying to achieve through the exclusion of 
prisoners from voting, were identified. 
 
In the Constitutional Court the policy objectives identified were based on the avoidance of 
logistical, financial and administrative difficulties,
345
 and the prevention and deterrence of 
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 Frodl v Austria [2010] ECHR  at [33] (hereafter Frodl v Austria (2010)). 
342
 Frodl v Austria (2010) at [34]. 
343
 Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) [2012] ECHR 868 at [108] (hereafter Scoppola v Italy (2012)). 
344
 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium [1987] 10 EHRR 1 at [52]. 
345
 August v Electoral Commission (1999) at [8]; Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) at [40]. 
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crime.
346
 With regards to the first objective, the Court found that it was not a legitimate 
objective and thus rejected it.
347
 With regards to the crime prevention and deterrence 
objective, the Court rejected the way in which the argument relating to such objective was 
presented, however the court accepted that ―at the level of policy it is important for the 
government to denounce crime and to communicate to the public that the rights that citizens 
have are related to their duties and obligations as citizens.‖348 In as far as the proportionality 
assessment was concerned, the Court found that the proportionality of the exclusion of 
prisoners had to be determined after taking into consideration the following factors: the 
length of the prison sentence; the type of offence; and the consideration of appeals which 
have not yet been finalised.
349
 
 
In the European Court the legitimate objectives identified were enhancing civic responsibility 
and respect for the rule of law,
350
 ensuring the proper functioning and preservation of the 
democratic regime,
351
 crime prevention,
352
 and punishment.
353
 These were the objectives 
identified in each of the cases relating to prisoner disenfranchisement and the court accepted 
one or more of these policy objectives as legitimate in each case.
354
 With regards to 
proportionality, the Court considered the following factors: the fact that the limitation can be 
imposed by a Court (the sentencing judge) or by the legislature through a blanket legislative 
rule; the type of offence (and whether there must be a relation between the offence committed 
and issues relating to elections and democratic institutions); and the length of the sentence.  
 
With regard to the first proportionality issue, the Court held that the intervention of a judge is 
in principle likely to guarantee the proportionality of restrictions on prisoners‘ voting rights, 
however the Court accepts that a well-tailored legislative rule might suffice as in Turkey, 
where ―disenfranchisement is an automatic consequence derived from the statute, and is 
therefore not left to the discretion or supervision of the judge.‖355  With regards to the length 
of the sentence and the type of offence, the Court held that even though in some cases there 
                                                          
346
 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) at [46] and [55]. 
347
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were categories of detained persons unaffected by the exclusion, some exclusions include a 
wide range of offenders and sentences (from one day to life and from minor offences to the 
most serious offences).
356
  With regards to the fact that there must be a relation between the 
offence committed and issues relating to elections and democratic institutions, the Court held 
that if there is a link the exclusion would definitely pass the proportionality test.
 357
 This does 
not mean that the opposite applies, and that exclusions will only be proportional in cases of 
electoral offences. 
 
After having considered all the principles developed and factors identified by the Courts, a 
conclusion is reached in the following part of this chapter as to how the South African 
Legislature can reform the country‘s electoral law. The suggestion is that South Africa revisit 
its current policy which allows all prisoners to vote, and to re-enact a provision which 
disenfranchises a section of the prisoner population, as a means to combat crime and 
inculcate greater civic responsibility among citizens. 
 
4.3  Suggestions for electoral reform 
 
After having considered South African Law, African Law, United Kingdom Law, and 
European Law, the conclusion reached is that not all prisoners should be permitted to vote. 
They should not be permitted to participate in making the very laws which they violated. 
 
The suggestion is that the South African government adopt the policy objectives which the 
European Court accepted as legitimate. The aim of disenfranchising prisoners should be to 
punish them, to prevent and deter crime, to enhance civic responsibility and respect for the 
rule of law, and ensuring the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic regime. 
In addition, in order for the disenfranchisement to be in line with the Constitution it should be 
limited to those offenders who have committed the more serious offences. With regards to the 
proportionality element, the argument is thus that the disenfranchisement does not have to be 
linked to the type of offence in order to determine how serious the offence is, because the 
length of a sentence imposed by a Court should give one an indication as to the seriousness of 
the offence. In addition, the limitation must not be left to the discretion of a sentencing judge 
but to the Legislature, and there need not be a relation between the offence committed and 
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issues relating to elections and democratic institutions, because the exclusion should be based 
on the length of the sentence received. 
 
A legislative voter exclusion, modelled on the existing constitutional limitation on the passive 
voting rights of citizens, would be compatible with section 19(3) of the Bill of Rights, the 
African Charter, and international human rights law generally. Whether such a voter 
exclusion should be reintroduced into Post-Apartheid law is thus purely a matter of policy. 
Given the threat which serious crime poses to the culture of human rights and democracy, 
there are no sound policy reasons why such a voter exclusion should not be reintroduced.  
 
It would therefore be appropriate to reconsider the comments by Chaskalson CJ and Ngcobo 
J and to enact their suggestions regarding section 47(1)(e) into law. Both of them hinted that 
the exclusion contained in section 47(1)(e) of the Constitution might be an exclusion which 
could be applied to prisoners‘ voting rights and it might pass the test of constitutionality.358 
Justice Ngcobo also raised the issue regarding the fact that the exclusion of prisoners as 
contained in the Electoral Act 1998 included both those prisoners who are serving a prison 
sentence while awaiting the outcome of an appeal and those whose appeals have been 
finalised. He saw this as a defect in the Act and suggested that it could be cured by reading 
the following phrase into the existing section 8(2)(f) after the phrase “serving a sentence of 
imprisonment without the option of a fine”: 
 
“but no one may be regarded as having been sentenced until an appeal against the conviction 
or sentence has been determined, or until the time for an appeal has expired”359 
 
If Ngcobo‘s suggestion had to be read into section 8(2)(f) the section would thus read as 
follows: 
 
―The chief electoral officer may not register a person as a voter if that person is serving a 
sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine, but no one may be regarded as having 
been sentenced until an appeal against the conviction or sentence has been determined, or until 
the time for an appeal has expired.‖ 
 
As the position regarding prisoner voting rights stands today, all prisoners are permitted to 
vote in national and provincial elections. This has been the position since the NICRO case 
                                                          
358
 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO [2004] at  [67] and [153]. 
359
 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO [2004] at [153]. 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
and the enactment of the Electoral Amendment Act of 2013. The proposal is that Parliament 
limits the rights of prisoners to take part in elections by enacting the following provision: 
 
―Anyone who is convicted of any offence in terms of South African Criminal Law and 
sentenced to more than 12 months imprisonment without the option of a fine may not vote in 
the National or Provincial elections, but no one may be regarded as having been sentenced 
until an appeal against the conviction or sentence has been determined, or until the time for 
an appeal has expired. This exclusion does not include a suspended sentence.‖  
 
As mentioned, I propose that this provision be enacted even though it does not specify types 
of offences, because if a court sees it fit to impose a prison sentence of more than 12 months, 
it would be safe to assume that the offence is not a minor one. Also, one should be careful to 
not convey a message to society that it is acceptable to commit certain offences, but not 
others. Society must know that no criminal activity will be tolerated. Offenders should know 
that they will not be rewarded with the right and responsibility of voting.
360
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 31 723 
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